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Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact that drug cartels and their associated violence have had on development 
in Mexico.  For this purpose, we monitor official and media reports to identify where cartels have 
operated with and without drug related homicides. Using the difference-in-difference kernel matching 
method, we find that on the one hand, inequality declined to a large extent in areas where cartels were 
active without incidents of drug related homicides. On the other, poverty increased in areas that had 
both the lowest and the highest rates of drug related homicides. Two reasons could explain this 
increase in poverty. In the most violent areas the number of employers and remunerations declined in 
key industries, such as manufacturing. In the least violent areas poverty increased possibly due to  
people migrating from the more violent places.  
 
JEL Classification: K49; O160; O170; R59; C26 
Keywords: Drug Cartels; Violence; Poverty; Inequality; Education; Migration; Kernel matching 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗
 Roxana is grateful for the hospitality of St Antony’s College and the Department of Economics at the 
University of Oxford where she spent her sabbatical leave and where much of this draft was completed. We are 
grateful to Professors Vincent Crawford, Roger Meyers, Imran Rasul and Alessandro Tarozzi for informal 
discussions in early stages of our work. We thank Sergio Ulises Andraca Castillo, sub-director of poverty 
measurement at CONEVAL for clarifying our questions on their poverty statistics. For useful discussion and 
comments, we also thank John Freddy Ariza, Yarine Fawaz, Thiemo Fetzer, Luciana Méndez, Adam Pepelasis, 
Vito Peragine, Xavi Ramos, Vania Sánchez, Francesc Trillas, the participants of the EDIE workshop and 
seminars held at the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona. We are grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Science 
and Innovation [ECO2013-46516-C4-1-R] and the Generalitat de Catalunya [2014 SGR 1279] for their financial 
support.  
+
 Corresponding Author: Associate Professor, Department of Applied Economics, Universidad Autónoma de 
Barcelona, Spain, 08193.  Tel: +34 93581 4572. Fax: +34 93 581 2292. Email: roxana.gutierrez@uab.es 
♦
 PhD candidate, Department of Applied Economics, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Spain, 08193.  
Email: monica.oviedo@uab.es 
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
Once upon a time, drug cartels operated “peacefully” in Mexico, smuggling illegal drugs to the United 
States. As the new millennium approached, cartels started fighting one another for territory. About 
6,680 people died as a result of the battle among cartels between 2001 and 2005 (Ríos and Shrik, 
2011). Felipe Calderón, the then recently elected President, concerned about the growing violence, 
declared war against cartels in December 2006. Instead of focusing on seizing drugs, as many of his 
predecessors had done, Calderón deployed more than 40,000 soldiers to tackle cartels in several areas 
(BBC News, 2009). He also arrested more cartel leaders than ever before.1 As efforts against cartels 
intensified, so did the violence and bloodshed (Dell, 2011). Over 63,000 killings occurred, the 
majority alleged drug traffickers, just between 2006 and 2012 (Molzahn et al., 2013; SNSP, 2011).2 
Cities and towns turned into battlefields with the local population becoming pray to extortions and 
other thefts (Gutiérrez-Romero and Conte, 2014).  
 Earlier studies have found that unemployment and migration from border areas to the United 
States increased in areas affected by drug related homicides (BenYishay and Pearlman, 2013; Dell, 
2011; Ríos, 2014b; Robles et al., 2013).  We contribute to the literature by estimating, for the first 
time, the impact that drug cartels and separately drug related homicides have had on poverty and 
inequality. We also explore how drug trafficking and drug violence could have affected these 
statistics.  We do so by assessing the changes in internal migration, education drop out, economic 
activity, and the number of employers, employees, remunerations and investment across various 
industries.   
 We evaluate the impact of cartels and drug related homicides using the difference-in-
difference kernel matching estimator (Heckman et al., 1998). Specifically, we estimate the change in 
outcomes before (2000-2005) and after cartels settled in areas for the first time (2006 or afterwards). 
We compare that change in outcomes to the ones experienced in areas that did not have cartels or drug 
related homicides over the same periods. We match areas -treatment and controls- based on their 
characteristics and their likelihood of experiencing cartels and drug related homicides. We identify the 
factors influencing the likelihood of areas having cartels and their associated violence according to the 
recent literature. These factors, described in detail in the next section, refer to the stricter policies 
imposed against cartels, and the political decentralization that Mexico experienced (Castillo et al. 
2012; Dell, 2011; Ríos, 2014a). 
 To identify the areas where cartels have been active (with and without related homicides) we 
survey official records; national and international media reports; and specialized blogs.  We also use 
                                                 
1
 Twenty eight top tier cartel kingpins were arrested or killed during Calderon’s administration (Guerrero-
Gutiérrez, 2011). Another 36,332 people were arrested for drug offenses -more than triple the number of arrests 
of the previous administration of Vicente Fox (Molzahn et al., 2013). Public security spending also increased 
seven times faster under Calderón’s than under Fox’s administration (Justice in Mexico Project, 2011). 
2 According to the Mexican General Attorney 90% of these casualties were members of drug cartels, 7% 
members of the army and police forces and the rest civilians. 
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the recently released official statistics on drug related homicides that are available only for the period 
December 2006 until September 2011 (SNSP, 2011). These statistics give the location and number of 
people killed in the battles among cartels and with the state authority. We also use the population and 
economic censuses, and poverty statistics, all representative at municipality level.  
 We find that in areas where cartels were active without incidents of drug related homicides 
inequality declined but had no changes in poverty. In contrast, in areas that had both the lowest and 
the highest rates of drug related homicides poverty increased whilst inequality did not change. Two 
reasons could explain this increase in poverty. The number of employers and remunerations in 
manufacturing declined in the areas with the highest rates of drug related homicides. Changes in 
population size and migration patterns also suggest people moved from more to less violent areas, 
perhaps relocating poor people within the country.   
 These impacts refer only to the areas that experienced cartels or drug related homicides for the 
first time in 2006 or afterwards, the period during which drug cartels expanded to new regions. 
Focusing on this period has the main advantage of capturing the immediate short-term impacts of 
cartels moving on to new areas. But it has the disadvantage of excluding those areas that suffered drug 
violence much earlier. In the robustness section we show that areas that experienced drug related 
homicides in an earlier period, during 2001-2005, also suffered an immediate rise in poverty, which 
increased even further during 2006-2010.  
 The paper continues as follows: The next section explains the reasons behind drug cartels 
fighting each other. Section 3 discusses the impact that cartels and their violence can have on 
development. Section 4 presents the econometric method and databases used. Section 5 estimates the 
impact of cartels and drug related homicides on welfare statistics. Section 6 tests the mechanisms that 
could explain our results. Section 7 shows the robustness checks, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. The causes of Mexican drug violence 
Most illegal drugs consumed today in the United States come through Mexico (Payan, 2006).3 It is no 
coincidence the world’s biggest consumer of narcotics and the world’s biggest supplier of narcotics 
happen to be neighbours (Keefe, 2012).  
 Drug trafficking is not new in Mexico. Cartels have been active in the country for over a 
century, and until recently without mayor episodes of violence. The peaceful coexistence among 
cartels was possible thanks to their agreement with some members of the state-authority, dominated by 
the 71-year old ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). PRI’s authoritarian regime enjoyed a 
strong supremacy of power across all levels of government. The lack of power switching, and the 
weak checks and balances, made the political system not only permissive, but protective of drug 
cartels (Astorga and Shirk, 2011; Buscaglia, 2013). In exchange for bribes, cartels were given 
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 Ninety per cent of cocaine and a third of heroin and marijuana available in the US enter via Mexico (Cook, 
2007).  
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protection from members of the state-authority to work in certain areas and shipment routes, called 
plazas. Campbell (2009) describes “Control of a plaza gives the drug lord and police commander of an 
area the power to charge less powerful traffickers tolls. . . The cartel that has the most power in a 
particular plaza receives police and military protections for its drug shipments.” (p. 23-24). These 
plazas came with a code of conduct.  Cartels needed to restrain from selling drugs in the domestic 
market, inciting violence and fighting directly with the state-authority (Gómez and Fritz, 2005). 
Cartels that violated agreements -for instance by trespassing into areas not authorised to work in- 
would be penalised by the state seizing drugs or eventually arresting or killing the cartel’s leaders 
(Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2009).  
 By the late 1990s, PRI’s domination was met with growing internal political opposition, 
resulting in major electoral reforms in 1997. These reforms increased electoral victories for opposition 
parties at the sub-national level.4  Battles among cartels over territory soon emerged. PRI’s defeat in 
the 2000 presidential election to the National Action Party (PAN) was a further blow to the stability 
and mediating role the state-authority had played with organised crime (Ríos, 2014a). So the turf war 
among drug lords intensified. At least 8,901 people were executed in the turf war among cartels during 
much of President Fox’s administration 2001-2006 (Molzahn et al., 2012; Ríos and Shrik, 2011). The 
victims were mainly cartels members and to lesser extent policemen and military personnel.5  In 
response to the new wave of violence, Fox increased security expenditure in areas mostly affected by 
violence. In 2006, the PAN party won for the second time the presidency. However the victory of 
PAN’s candidate, Felipe Calderón, was marred by allegations of rigging and stealing the presidency 
from the closest contender from the Party of Democratic Revolution. To regain legitimacy, critics 
suggest, Calderón chose to tackle the growing problem of drug violence (Ravelo, 2012).  
Calderón actively prosecuted drug cartels with military force in their hotspots, reducing 
temporarily the violence in 2007.6 However, violence ignited again in 2008 and to unforeseen levels in 
2010.7 According to official statistics, 47,515 people died because of the conflict among cartels and 
the state from December 2006 to September 2011. These casualties represent half of all national 
homicides (Fig. 1). By 2011, Mexico had 12 out of the 50 most violent cities in the world (CCSPJP, 
2011).  
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 Ríos (2014a) explains that 2,162 out of the 2,475 municipalities were ruled by the same party across all levels 
in 1990. The number of municipalities sharing the same party across all government’s levels declined to 1,654 in 
1998 and to 1,433 in 2010. 
5
 Half of the executions took place in Michoacán, a state by the pacific coast, which witnessed the cartels "La 
Familia" and "Los Zetas" battle over territory. Another 30% of the executions were concentrated in the northern 
states of Sinaloa and Tamaulipas. The violence also affected major cities such as Acapulco, Guadalajara, Mexico 
City and Tijuana.  
6
 According to official estimates 60% of the police force was already infiltrated by drug-traffickers, one of the 
reasons why Calderón deployed the army instead (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011; Salinas de Gortari, 2011).  
7
 Two parallel conflicts fuelled this violence (The Economist, 2012). The Sinaloa cartel fell out with its former 
allies, the cartels of Juarez, Tijuana and Culiacán. Also, the Gulf cartel fell out with the Zetas, an ex-military 
group that it had hired as its enforcer since 1996.   
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Despite the efforts against drug trafficking, cartels also multiplied. In 2006, there were six 
major cartels, by 2010 they had multiplied to 16 (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011). The number of cartels 
increased partly because some fractured into two or more over leadership disputes.  New cartels also 
emerged. Others became transnational, like the Sinaloa cartel, allegedly active now in over 50 
countries (Keefe, 2012).  
Several researchers agree that Calderón’s enforcement strategy was largely responsible for 
increasing drug violence and multiplying cartels (Dell, 2011; Escalante, 2011; Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 
2011; Lessing, 2012; Merino, 2011; Osorio, 2012). For instance, Guerrero-Gutiérrez (2011) using 
event history analysis shows that after the government arrest of a cartel’s kingpin, drug related 
violence immediately follows and intensifies over three months as drug cartels fight over leadership. 
Similarly, Dell explains that Mayors from the PAN party are more likely to ask for federal support to 
intensify crackdowns against cartels. Using regression discontinuity, Dell shows the probability of 
experiencing drug related homicides increased by nine percentage points in municipalities where the 
PAN party won the local elections (by a close margin compared to areas where the PAN lost by a 
close margin). The drug violence spread to areas with good transport networks and in close proximity 
to borders and the coast. Overall, Dell estimates that cartel attempts to control new territories after the 
arrest or death of rival cartel leaders explain over 85% of drug related homicides.  
Ríos (2014a) provides a complementary explanation for the drug violence. She recalls that 
during the permissive era of the PRI’s 71-year ruling, the state would arrest and even kill drug’s lords 
from time to time. Yet, cartels would not retaliate with violence. So, Ríos argues that decentralization 
is the key element that drove the new violence under the Fox and Calderon administrations. The 
decentralization meant that for the first time some municipalities did not share the same political party 
as the federal or state administration. Hence, the coordination between different levels of state-
authority and cartels became difficult. Cartels were forced to seek new agreements with the new 
political actors, and armed themselves to protect their territory or confront rivals. 
The ease with which cartels armed themselves is explained by Dube et al. (2013). They recall 
that in 2004 the US Federal Assault Weapon Ban expired. The expiry of this law lifted the prohibition 
on domestic sales of military-style firearms in most of the US, but with important differences across 
border states. California retained the pre-existing state-level ban. In contrast, many other US-Mexican 
border states did not, including Texas, Arizona and New Mexico. This explains why homicides rose 
by 60% more in Mexican municipalities at the non-California entry ports, in comparison with 
municipalities 100 miles away.   
Castillo et al. (2012) explain yet another change, outside of Mexican politics, that contributed 
further to the violence. Colombia’s anti-drug strategy shifted in July 2006 when Juan Manuel Santos 
(today’s President of Colombia) became the Minister of Defence. This new strategy shifted the 
emphasis from attacking the drug production chain to seizing cocaine, intercepting drug shipments and 
destroying cocaine processing labs.  This policy drove Colombian cartels to relocate in Mexico. As the 
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supply of cocaine was successfully reduced, the price of street cocaine in the US increased. This 
incentivised criminal organisations to fight to keep their lucrative market, fuelling more violence.  
 
3. The impact of drug cartels and their violence  
Drug cartels represent an important industry in the economy. According to RAND Corporation 
Mexican cartels make about $6.6 billion in gross revenue from exporting drugs just to the US (Keefe, 
2012). Lee estimates that more than 50% of the profits earned by the cartel’s leaders never return to 
the country (Cited by Ríos, 2008). The drug money that eventually makes its way back to Mexico will 
bribe whoever needs to be bribed to keep the business going.8 Some of these drug profits will also 
fund growing more marijuana and poppy, producing more synthetic drugs (mainly methamphetamine 
and ecstasy), and buying more cocaine from South America. Ríos (2008) estimates that the illicit drug 
industry hires 468,000 people in Mexico, making it the fourth largest employer among all the main 
industries. Cartels’ direct labour demand includes low-skill workers to produce and transport the drugs 
to the US, and high-skill workers such as chemists, lawyers, accountants and those in charge of 
security. Security services, for instance, include trained mercenaries, but also civilians watching out 
for any changes in federal security or along the US border, known as falcons (Keefe, 2012).  
 The job opportunities and extra capital offered by cartels have the potential to benefit the 
economy, reduce poverty and inequality in the local areas where they work. There is anecdotal 
evidence that some rural areas have benefited from drug money. For instance, Marín (2002) recalls 
that he expected to find poverty and lack of infrastructure in his field work in rural areas in Sinaloa, 
the cradle of drug trafficking in Mexico. He found the opposite. Farmers he interviewed recounted that 
out of need, they chose to work for drug dealers instead. One of the interviewees explained “…[Drug 
traffickers] pay in cash, upfront, up to five years in advance. They absorb any real losses, give good 
profits, subsidise irrigation infrastructure, harvest and help farmers that get arrested by soldiers by 
financially supporting their families and paying the lawyers” (p. 4, own translation).  
 Drug money also gets “legalized” by filtering into various industries, such as real state, 
finance and retailing. These industries are easy targets as they can receive large amounts of cash and 
due to weak regulation in money laundering. Although drug cartels may filter capital into local 
economies, over time drug money can affect long-term development. The endemic corruption that 
allows cartels to operate might distort incentives for investing in other sectors. Drug money that gets 
legalized can also drive legitimate businesses into bankruptcy. Former State Department official 
Jonathan Winer explains “…the drug trafficker is happy to pay 6% or 8% or 10% loss, reverse 
interest, to have that money laundered. So they have a competitive advantage over everybody. So they 
go into a business…they can take...over. ” (Zill and Berman, 2013). 
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 Genaro García Luna, Mexico’s former secretary of public security, estimates cartels spend more than a billion 
dollars annually just bribing the Mexican municipal police (Keefe, 2012). 
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 Drug violence is another externality. Cartels have two options when their informal pacts with 
the state break down: Exit business or resort to violence to establish control over territory. Violence is 
aimed at building the organization's reputation and inhibiting deviations from agreements and potential 
rivals. For this purpose, Mexican cartels have hired militias. Typically, these militias had been people 
who deserted the army or police. But, as the violence spread and intensified, cartels have also recruited 
unemployed youth (usually with a criminal record), and even children. Between 30,000 and 50,000 
children in Mexico have been recruited by various cartels as mercenaries (Derechos Infancia, 2010). 
Cartels then, can reduce the human capital stock if young people drop out of school for short-term 
profit or because of drug dependency.  
Violence, whether resulting from war or crime, can affect development (Soares, 2009). In 
Mexico, the drug related violence apart from its large humanitarian costs; has also affected civilian 
populations and businesses. Using crime victimization surveys in Mexico, Gutiérrez-Romero and 
Conte (2014) find that population in areas affected by drug related homicides increased their security 
spending and changed behaviour to prevent being victims of crime (such as avoiding going out at 
night). Despite these extra precautions, extortions and other thefts increased in these areas. The extra 
risks associated with living in these areas provide people incentives to flee. As a result, local 
businesses might see their market shrinking and their costs rising. Cost could rise out of the need of 
increasing security spending, potentially paying higher salaries to keep personnel, and the possibility 
of cartels extorting firms directly. Thus, businesses might either reduce their investment or eventually 
flee the area, destructing jobs (Evans et al., 2012; Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2012). This could explain 
why other studies have found that unemployment increased in areas affected by drug related violence 
in Mexico (BenYishay and Pearlman, 2013; Dell, 2011; Robles et al., 2013).  
 The high incidence of drug related homicides, casualties mostly of Mexican origin, suggests 
that some of the local population is involved in drug trafficking. Thus, it is not obvious whether 
poverty will be affected and how. Government intervention might be able to offset some of the 
negative impacts of drug violence by transferring extra resources to people and areas that need it. 
However, if government’s extra security spending comes at the expense of reducing social and public 
services, then government intervention might be unable to offset a potential negative effect. 
Remittances, a large source of income for many Mexican families, could also offset some of the 
impacts of the drug violence.  
 
3.1 A theoretical model on the impact of drug cartels and their violence  
We summarise our discussion on the potential impact of drug cartels on development by adapting the 
standard neoclassical growth model. We assume that a country has i=1,…,n municipalities. 
Municipality i has a Cobb-Douglas production function, with constant returns to scale as in Eq.(1). 
                                                                        
αα −
=
1
ititit LAKY                                                               (1) 
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where Yit is municipality output at time t. A is the level of technology, Kit is the municipality’s level of 
capital and Lit is the level of labour. Assume the capital comes from two industries: a legal one and an 
illegal one dedicated to trafficking drugs. The total amount of capital is given by 
d
it
l
itit KKK )1( ϕϕ −+= , where litK is the amount of capital in the legal industry and ditK is the 
amount of capital in the illegal drugs industry. The share of capital coming from each industry 
depends on ϕ , a parameter measuring the strength of institutions, which influences how easily drug 
cartels can operate. Similarly, the total amount of labour is given by  dit
l
itit LLL )1( ϕϕ −+=  , where 
l
itL is the amount of labour in the legal industry and 
d
itL is the amount of labour in the illegal drug 
industry. For simplicity we ignore the stock of human capital.  
 Assuming a constant saving rate, s, such that St=sYt, and a capital depreciation rate δ per 
period, which we assume to be equal in both industries, the annual investment is equal to 
ttt KKI δ+∆= +1 . The dynamics of capital accumulation are given then by Eq. (2) 
                                                                 ititti sYKK +−=+ )1(1, δ                                                       (2) 
 Expressing quantities in per capita terms, the intensity of capital is given by ititit LKk /=  and 
the production function ititit LYy /= . Thus, dividing Eq. (2), the capital accumulation by Lit, we obtain: 
                                                              ititti sykkn +−=+ + )1()1( 1, δ                                                 (3) 
where n is the population growth rate.  
 Following the modification proposed by Miguel and Roland (2011), we assume that there is a 
minimum subsistence consumption level, cmin>0, below which consumption cannot fall. Then, the 
savings per capita in municipality i will be given by sit=min{yit-cmin, syit}. In the case where the per 
capita consumption hits the cmin constraint, then the municipality will be caught in a poverty trap. In 
such a case, there will be no further per capita accumulation, itti kk ≤+1, . A poverty trap will arise if 
and only if  
                                                                   min)( cknAk itit ++≤ δα                                                      (4) 
 There is a ktrap>0, below which inequality (4) is satisfied. A higher minimum consumption, 
faster population growth and higher depreciation all increase the poverty trap level of ktrap. 
 Assuming that there is no factor mobility across municipalities, in terms of capital or 
population, the steady-state level of capital accumulation per capita, k* will be defined by 
αδ *** )1()1( sAkkkn +−=+ .  Thus, municipalities with a higher level of total capital (regardless if 
legal or illegal in origin) will converge to a higher steady state than those with lower level of total 
capital.  
 Now assume that at a later time, m<n municipalities face an idiosyncratic shock: drug related 
violence. This random shock represents an extra expense, in terms of consumption of security 
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measures which affects both industries. Depending on the magnitude of the extra expense required to 
safeguard security, investors might be able to stay afloat, that is if k>ktrap. Investors in the formal and 
illegal industries however, might face a different ability and willingness to compensate for the shock.  
Consider that in net terms total capital falls below the level needed ktrap. Then, municipality m will fall 
into a poverty trap permanently if there is no factor mobility, or government or remittance assistance 
that could absorb the shock. The rest of the municipalities not experiencing such a shock will continue 
along their normal path of growth. 
 A different scenario could emerge if capital and labour could flow into municipalities not 
affected by the shock until the marginal returns of these factors is equalized across the affected and 
non-affected municipalities. Also external intervention (in the form of government aid or remittances) 
could increase the income of the affected municipalities. Whether these municipalities manage to 
escape the poverty trap will depend on the size of the intervention. 
 In our empirical analysis we will be unable to provide a break down of capital coming from 
legal or illegal industries. However, we can evaluate what happened, in net terms, to the number of 
owners, employees, remunerations and investment across various industries. These changes could 
reveal if production factors shifted from more to less violent areas, for instance. We would expect 
larger changes in industries with more flexibility to outsource their production to other areas, or which 
depend more on national or international markets, rather than the local market, such as manufactures. 
Businesses that depend more on the local market might find it more difficult to shift their production 
to avoid violence, thus are more likely to adjust more slowly.  
 In the next section we evaluate empirically the impact of cartels and their violence. These will 
reveal short-term impacts. However, our theoretical discussion here, suggests that some of these 
impacts could also persist in the long-run. 
 
4. Econometric strategy and data sources 
To estimate the impact of drug cartels and their associated violence we rely on the methods proposed 
by the quasi-experimental literature. Quasi-experiments do not assign treatments randomly.9 So, we 
cannot estimate accurately the impact of drug violence by simply comparing areas that experienced 
this violence and those that did not. This simple comparison would ignore that drug cartels might be 
more active in certain areas given their underlying characteristics, such as closeness to the US border 
and degree of political decentralization. This simple comparison would also ignore that areas might 
suffer changes not necessarily because of the drug violence, but perhaps due to unobserved 
characteristics, such as levels of corruption. 
                                                 
9
 According to Shadish et al. (2002) “Assignment to conditions is by means of self-selection, by which units 
choose treatment for themselves, or means of administrative selection, by which ...bureaucrats… or others decide 
which persons should get which treatment.” (p. 13-14)  
 9 
 To address these concerns we combine the difference-in-difference estimator with propensity 
score matching, as proposed by Heckman et al. (1997). This estimator compares the change in 
outcomes of treated areas, before and after they get treated, to the change in outcomes of 
“comparable” areas used as control group. These areas are matched based on the likeness of their 
characteristics. To this end, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) estimate a propensity score, which 
measures the conditional probability of areas receiving the treatment (Di=1) given a vector of 
observable baseline characteristics Xi.  Areas are then matched according to their propensity scores, pi, 
which summarise in a single index the distribution of their baseline characteristics.  
                                                                
                                                               pi =pr(Di =1Xi)                                                              (6) 
 
 Based on the estimated propensity score, Heckman et al. (1997) estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT)  as in Eq. (7): 
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where Y1 and Y0 are the observed mean outcomes under the condition of treatment and non-treatment 
respectively. n1 represents the size of the treatment group and n0 the size of the control group, both in 
the common support area of the estimated propensity scores. ),( jiW  represents the weights assigned 
to each control municipality j, which depend on the particular matching estimator employed. We use 
kernel matching, which uses the estimated propensity scores to calculate a weighted mean such that it 
gives more weight to those control municipalities that are closer matches and downweights more 
distant observations. Kernel matching also has the advantage of using more observations than other 
matching algorithms, thereby reducing the estimation’s variance (Guo and Fraser, 2010, p. 245).Thus, 
the weighting function is equal to: 
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where G(·) denotes the kernel function. an is a bandwidth parameter, and  pi is the estimated propensity 
score of the treated municipalities.  pj and pk are the estimated propensity scores of municipalities in 
the control group.  
Combining the PSM and DD has two main advantages. First, we match comparable treatment 
and control areas based on their observable characteristics. Second, by estimating the changes over 
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time we remove time invariant unobserved characteristics that might affect outcomes (Smith and Todd, 
2005). Our estimator could still be biased if there are any time variant unobserved characteristics that 
affect our outcomes over time. We could face this issue, if for instance, municipalities suffering from 
drug related homicides receive more subsidies than other areas to cope with the harmful effect of the 
violence. To lessen the risk of such a bias, we estimate the PSM-DD estimator controlling for 
covariates that might have changed over time thereby influencing our outcomes, as in Eq. (9).10 We 
estimate this regression using panel fixed effects at municipality level. 
 
 itiitititiit urTreatmentPostTreatmentPostwY εβββββ ++++++= 43210 )*()(        (9) 
 
where Yit is the outcome of interest for the municipality i at time t (t=0 before, and t=1 after treatment). 
Treatmenti is a dummy variable equal to 1 for treated and 0 for the control municipalities. Posti is a 
dummy variable representing whether the observation is after treatment. Thus, the regression 
coefficient β3 measures the difference-in-difference estimator. That is the impact of cartels (or drug 
related homicides). ui and εit represent the residuals. rit is a vector of time-varying variables. These are: 
the growth in remittances and poor-relief subsidies per capita, both at municipality level; and the 
state’s unemployment rate to consider the labour market of the region. All variables in rit are lagged by 
two years to avoid having endogeneity issues with the intensity of drug related violence.  
 
4.1 Data 
We use the 2005 and 2010 population censuses to assess the impact on inequality (Gini coefficient), 
migration, education and electricity consumption. As the 2005 mid-census does not provide figures for 
unemployment, for that statistic we use the 2000 and 2010 censuses.  
 We also use the official poverty statistics. An independent Mexican institute, CONEVAL, 
estimated these statistics combining household surveys (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto) with 
the population census using small-area statistics.  
 To identify the mechanisms affecting our poverty and other welfare measures, we analyse four 
industries: manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, and real state. Specifically, we analyse the 
number of business-owners, employees, remunerations, and investment of each of these industries at 
municipality level.11 Since surveys are unrepresentative at that small-area level, instead we use the 
economic census of 2004 and 2009. These censuses were conducted between 1 January to 31 
December 2003 and 2008 respectively.  
 We do not analyse other industries, such as construction and finance, because the census does 
not distinguish in which municipalities their production took place.  
                                                 
10
 We estimate all regressions in Stata with the command xtreg. We obtain the kernel-weighs using the command 
psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).  
11
 Total investment refers to stock variation of gross fixed capital stock, so it can take positive or negative values. 
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Drug related homicides 
To identify which areas experienced drug violence we use two data sources: official statistics and 
online reports. 12  The official statistics refer to the casualties credited to the conflict among cartels and 
the state. According to these, 1,148 out of 2,456 municipalities experienced at least one drug related 
homicide between December 2006 and December 2010. In total there were 34,612 drug related 
homicides during that period, 42% concentrated in just 2 out of the 32 Mexican states (Table A.1 in 
Appendix).  
 For the period during which there are no official statistics on drug related casualties we 
surveyed government and media reports, as well as specialized blogs. Our search was limited to 
identifying which municipalities experienced killings as a direct result of confrontations among cartels 
and the state. (That is, we do not estimate the incidence of drug related homicides.)  
 There are disadvantages in using media reports to detect drug cartels. For instance, for fear of 
retaliation some journalists are censoring news on cartels. 13 Thus, we left our search open to all online 
media reports, not focusing on a particular local or national media. We also surveyed online 
government reports to lessen a potential bias in media self-censorship. Although the government until 
2006 was not systematically counting the number of drug related homicides, bulletins reporting such 
incidents were issued occasionally.   
 We found that 248 municipalities experienced drug related homicides between January 2000 
and December 2005. Most of these areas, Osorio (2012) also identified as having been affected by 
drug violence during the same period (Fig. 2).14 Ninety per cent of these municipalities experienced 
drug related homicides again between December 2006 and September 2011, according to official 
statistics.  
 We also surveed online reports for drug related homicides for the period where there is official 
information on these casualties. Our search during that period focused only on the areas that official 
statistics regarded as free of drug related homicides. We found 63 municipalities with media reporting 
drug related homicides in these areas, yet not appearing in the official statistics. We excluded these 63 
areas from our analysis to lessen the risk of potential double counting of casualties (in case the 
government identified these casualties but credited them to other areas), and also to control for 
potential differences in the definitions used by the government and media houses as to what counts as 
drug related homicides. 
                                                 
12
 Previous articles have monitored online media records to identify where cartels operate with and without drug 
violence at small area level (Osorio, 2012; Coscia and Ríos, 2012). To the best of our knowledge, none of these 
datasets have been available to public. In contrast to these previous efforts, we searched for online reports 
manually, not relying on automated algorithms. Reading the media reports and watching the online TV reports 
help us to reduce errors as to where cartels operated with and without violence.  
13
 Mexico ranked as the fifth deadliest place in the world for journalists in 2010 with over 30 deaths or 
disappearances of journalists and media workers since Calderón took office (Committee to Protect Journalists, 
2010).   
14
 Osorio (2012) monitored 11 national newspapers; 47 local newspapers; and press releases from the army, 
navy, federal police and the Attorney General’s Office. 
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Cartels without drug related homicides 
We also surveyed online reports to identify the areas where cartels are active without instances of drug 
related homicides. We surveyed government bulletins, for instance, on arrests of drug cartels 
members, seizing of drugs or drugs labs, as well as online media reports and specialized blogs. We 
found 243 municipalities where cartels were active without instances of drug related homicides 
between January 2000 and December 2005. Another 145 municipalities had cartels working without 
instances of drug related homicides from January 2006 until December 2010.  
 
5. Estimating the impact of cartels and drug related homicides 
 
5.1 Control group selection 
We use as control group (for all our treatment groups described below) municipalities that were free of 
cartels and drug related homicides during 2000-2010.  Some of these control municipalities are near 
areas that experienced drug related violence, a closeness that could bias our impact estimates. To 
minimise this possibility we exclude “buffer” municipalities. That is, areas free of drug related 
homicides during 2000-2010, but which are near to those municipalities that experienced drug related 
homicides.15  In the next section we present the results which remove buffer areas located within 10 
kilometres of the epicentre of affected areas. These are our preferred results as the remaining control 
areas are still near enough to the treated areas to serve as proxies of the labour market conditions of 
the affected areas, yet without being too close thereby minimizing spill over effects. In Section 7 we 
show that our results remain similar even if we remove buffer areas that are further away from the 
affected areas. 
 
5.2 Treatment group selection 
We estimate separately two types of impacts: Drug cartels being active in an area with and without 
violence. To measure the impact of drug cartels alone, without violence, we define the treatment group 
as municipalities where cartels moved into to traffic drugs, and did so for the first time between 
December 2006 and December 2010, and that did not suffer any drug related homicides during 2000-
2010.  
 To measure the impact of drug related homicides we define the treatment group as 
municipalities that experienced at least one drug related homicide for the first time between December 
2006 and December 2010 according to official records, and that did not have any cartels or drug 
related homicides during 2000-2005.  
 Given the high variance in drug related homicide rates, the impact of this violence is unlikely 
to be linear or even quadratic. To assess whether the impact differed according to the intensity of 
                                                 
15
 Table 5 shows that in 20% of buffer areas homicide rates increased by two or more standard deviations above 
their historical average. 
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homicides, we divide the second treatment group into four subgroups. The first subgroup consists of 
municipalities in the tenth decile according to their rate of drug related homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants. This group has a much higher average drug related homicide ratio (288.15) than the rest 
(23.5) (Figure A.1). We split the remaining 90% of the areas affected by drug homicides into equally 
sized tertiles.  
 
5.3 Propensity score matching 
We estimate the propensity scores of areas experiencing cartels with and without violence using probit 
models. In these models we use covariates that jointly influence the likelihood of treatment and 
outcomes. Following the literature on drug cartels, we use as covariates: municipalities’ ruling party 
(PAN or PRI); a dummy variable on whether the municipality has the same ruling party as the state 
(decentralized). We also use: municipality’s population size; location (by coast or border); closest 
distance to border and coast; GDP per capita; percentage of children attending school; percentage of 
households receiving remittances; subsidies received; trends in homicide rates; whether urban, rural or 
mixed.  
 Table A.2 shows the results from the probit regressions, as marginal effects, for the two types 
of treatments: experiencing cartels with and without drug related homicides.  Table A.2 also includes 
the scores for each of the four subgroups treated by drug related homicides (the 10th decile and 
tertiles). We estimate these scores ensuring they satisfy the balancing property within the region of 
common support. 16  Then, we match the treatment and control areas using Epanechnikov kernel 
matching with a bandwith of 0.06.  
 Table A.3 shows that there are no statistically significant differences in the covariates used to 
estimate the propensity scores between the matched treatment and control areas. These matched areas 
have the same distribution of characteristics before treatments began (See Table A.4). Also, the 
distribution of their propensity scores overlap well, as Fig. A.2 shows. 
 In Table A.5 we show the areas we use as treatment and control groups by state. Fig. 3 shows 
the matched areas used to estimate the impact of cartels without incidents of drug related homicides. 
We have 70 treated municipalities and 409 control municipalities within the region of common 
support. Fig. 4 shows the areas used to estimate the impact of drug related homicides. We remain with 
668 treated municipalities and 554 control ones within the region of common support. Fig. 4 also 
shows that the areas least affected by drug related homicides (first and second tertile) are mostly in the 
south and central part of the country. The areas with the highest levels of drug related homicides are in 
the northern part of the country. This confirms the intensity of battles among cartels intensifies closer 
to the US border, the end drug market.   
                                                 
16
 Following Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we identify the region of common support as the overlap between the 
two distributions of the propensity scores of the treatment and control groups. 
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 We find the matched treatment and control areas had parallel trends across various statistics 
long before treatment began, which is essential for the difference-in-difference estimator to be 
unbiased. Fig. A.3, A.4 and A.5 show the trends in homicide rates, poverty and an index of 
marginalization17 between the treatment and control group from 1990 until 2010.  Fig. A.3, Panel A 
shows that treatment areas where cartels were active without drug related homicides had a parallel 
trend in total homicide rates with their control group from 1990 until 2008. In 2009, the control group 
reported even more deaths, reflecting that this treatment group was not affected by drug related 
homicides. Similarly, Fig A.3 Panel B shows the treatment areas that were affected by drug related 
homicides had a parallel trend in total homicide rates with their control group from 1990 until mid-
2000. This parallel trend breaks after 2006, when this treatment group started experiencing drug 
related homicides, unlike the controls.  
 After ensuring the matched areas are suitable treatment and control groups we ran the panel 
fixed effects regression. We included as covariates: the growth in remittances, poor-relief subsidies 
per capita and the state’s unemployment rate. To avoid endogeneity problems we include all these 
lagged for two years.  
 
Impact on poverty and inequality 
We analyse the impact on three measures of poverty. Food poverty measures the percentage of the 
population that cannot buy a basic food basket. Capability poverty adds those who cannot cover their 
health and education needs. And patrimony poverty adds those who cannot cover their clothing, 
housing and public transport needs.  
 Areas where cartels were active without drug related homicides did not suffer a change in 
poverty, relative to their control group. However, inequality in these areas decreased by 0.391 standard 
deviations (Table 1, panel A, columns 1-4).  
 In contrast, inequality did not change in areas affected by drug related homicides, relative to 
their control groups. However, food poverty increased (by 0.170 standard deviations) among the areas 
in the top decile of highest rate of drug related homicides. Patrimony poverty also increased (by 0.153 
standard deviations) among the areas that experienced the lowest rate of drug related homicides, 
relative to their control group. In net terms, drug related homicides increased the number of people 
living in food poverty by 25,577 and the number of people living in patrimony poverty by 88,966 in 
these areas.   
 It is unclear why drug related homicides had a non-linear effect on poverty, affecting only the 
areas with the highest and lowest drug related homicide rates. The geographic location of these areas 
                                                 
17
 The index of marginalization measures the percentage of population: that cannot read or write, without 
complete primary, without drainage or bathroom, without electricity, without piped water, co-habiting in 
overcrowding conditions, living in a household without soil floor; living in population of less than 5,000 
inhabitants, earning up to two minimum salaries.  
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might explain these results.  Areas in the first tertile are along the route where cartels traffic cocaine 
from South America to US, but not where the cultivation of marijuana and poppy has increased the 
most. So, the economic benefits that cartels bring to these areas might not offset the negative effects 
caused by the violence, thereby increasing poverty. In contrast, the areas with most drug related 
homicides are in regions that experienced a sharp increase in cultivation of illegal drugs. These are 
mostly in states by the Pacific coast and the so called golden triangle formed by Sinaloa, Durango and 
Chihuahua. The sharp increase in drug production is also reflected in the efforts of the Mexican 
government to destroy illegal crops there (Fig. 5). The drug economy in these areas might offset some 
of the negative effects of the violence. But, it is likely that as the violence intensifies, so do its 
negative effects. This could explain why we find an increase in poverty in areas in the top decile.  
 
Impact on migration and population 
We evaluate the impact on migration by focusing on two indicators. The percentage of people who 
claimed to have lived in another state five years ago and the percentage of people who claimed to have 
lived in the US five years ago. We are likely to underestimate migration patterns using these statistics 
as they do not capture, for instance, if people relocated within the same state, but to a safer 
municipality. To capture some of these internal migration patterns we also assess the change in 
municipalities’ population size. 
 We find that, areas where drug cartels were active without drug related homicides did not 
experience as a result changes in their population size or migration patterns (Table 1, panel A, 
columns 5-7).  Neither of these statistics changed in areas with the highest drug related homicides 
rates. In contrast, areas with the lowest drug related homicide rates, in the first tertile, had a large 
increase in the percentage of people who lived in another state five years ago (1.55 standard 
deviation). Population size also increased in these areas, and those in the second tertile, relative to 
their control group (Table 1, panel B, column 7). These impacts suggest that population might have 
migrated from more to less violent areas. 
 
Impact on human capital 
To assess the impact on human capital we focus on: the percentage of children aged 6-14 out of school 
and the percentage of population aged 15+ without complete primary.18 Neither of these statistics 
changed in areas where cartels were active without drug related homicides (Table 1, panel A, columns 
8-9). In contrast, both statistics increased in areas that experienced at least one drug related homicide, 
and especially so in the areas with the lowest rates of drug related homicides. The percentage of 
children aged 6-14 out of school also increased in the areas in the second tertile (Table 1, panel B, 
column 8).  
                                                 
18
 In the Mexican schooling system children aged 6-11 are normally in primary school, those aged 12-14 in 
secondary school and those aged 15-18 in high school. 
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 Earlier we showed that both internal migration and population size increased in areas with the 
lowest incidence of drug related homicides. Thus, education outcomes might have worsened because 
of population pressures. Table 1 columns 10-11 show that the population of education age increased in 
areas in the first and second tertile, while it decreased in areas in the top ten decile of drug related 
homicides. Nonetheless, the number of schools and teachers per pupil did not change in the first 
tertile, and the ratio of teachers per pupil even improved among the areas in the second tertile (Table 1, 
columns 12-13). Thus, it is unlikely that education outcomes worsened because of a shrinking supply 
of schooling. Rises in poverty, drug dependency and children engaging in drug trafficking could 
perhaps explain the rise in schooling dropout. Our results then add evidence to the detrimental effects 
of violence on education found by Magaloni (2012) who show test scores worsened in areas affected 
by drug violence.  
 
Impact on economic activity and unemployment  
We estimate the impact on area’s economy by assessing the changes in electricity consumption. The 
literature uses this statistic to measure changes in overall activity, especially in the informal economy. 
For instance, Robles et al. (2013) find that electricity consumption did not change in areas with the 
highest increase in overall homicides rates -drug related and not- in Mexico. Suggesting the economy 
in these areas did not slow down, despite the violence.  
 We find no change in consumption of electricity in areas where cartels operated peacefully, or 
in the bottom 90 percent of drug related homicides (Table 1, columns 14-15). However, electricity 
consumption increased in areas with the highest rates of drug related homicides, in the tenth decile. 
Despite the high-level of drug violence, the economy in these areas increased, suggesting that it was 
driven by the informal activity. We explore next the impact on unemployment rates, another statistic 
of economic activity. 
 Previous studies have found that unemployment rates increased in municipalities affected by 
drug related homicides using quarterly labour surveys. Although these surveys are nationally 
representative, they are not representative at municipality level. Since our interest is to measure the 
impacts at small area level we instead use the population censuses, which are representative at 
municipality level. Since unemployment rates are not available in the mid census, conducted in 2005, 
we can only estimate the change in unemployment rates between the years 2000 and 2010.  
 We find no impact on the unemployment rate or number of unemployed in areas where cartels 
were active but without drug related homicides (Table 1 Panel A, columns 16 and 17). Similarly, the 
number of unemployed remained unchanged across all the subgroups affected by drug related 
homicides. However, the unemployment rate decreased among the municipalities with the lowest 
incidence of drug related homicides, whilst remaining unchanged in the other groups. 
 Our results on unemployment do not necessarily contradict earlier studies. We are using 
different data sources, and exploring changes over different periods. Importantly our definition of 
 17 
treatment varies as well. In Section 7, we show that unemployment increased among the areas that 
experienced the highest jump in overall homicides rates, when we use the same treatment definition as 
Robles et al.  
 
6. Potential mechanisms: Impact of cartels and drug related homicides on industries 
In this section, we evaluate the impact on key industries. We do so to understand why cartels and drug 
violence affected poverty and other welfare statistics. We take the information on industries from the 
economic census. Since the economic censuses were conducted in different years to the population 
census used earlier,  we redefine slightly our treatment and control groups .19  
 Areas that did not have cartels nor drug related homicides during 2000-2008 serve as our 
control group. As before, we exclude from this group buffer areas within 10 kilometres of those that 
experienced at least one drug related homicide during 2000-2008. 
 We redefine slightly the first treatment group as: municipalities where cartels moved into to 
traffic drugs for the first the time between December 2006 and December 2008; and that did not suffer 
any drug related homicides during 2000-2008.  
 The second treatment group is: municipalities that experienced for the first time at least one 
drug related homicide between December 2006 and December 2008; and that did not have any cartels 
or drug related homicides during 2000-2005. As before, we divide the areas that experienced drug 
related homicides into four subgroups (by tertiles and the top tenth decile). 
 
6.2 Propensity score matching 
We estimate the likelihood -propensity scores- of areas experiencing cartels with and without violence 
using probit regressions. To estimate these scores we use the same covariates as in the previous 
section. We show the results of these probit regressions, as marginal effects, in Table A.6. All 
estimated scores satisfy the balancing property. The distribution of scores overlap well between the 
treatment and control groups (Fig. A.6). There are no statistically significant differences in the 
covariates used to estimate the propensity scores between the matched treatment and control areas 
(Table A.7). These areas, also had on average the same distribution of characteristics before treatments 
began (Table A.8) 
 After matching the areas, we include as controls in the panel fixed effects regression: the two 
year lagged growth in remittances, poor-relief subsidies per capita and the state’s unemployment rate. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 The latest economic census refers to data gathered in 2008. Thus, we are unable to assess the impact of drug 
related homicides that peaked in 2010. According to official records there were 9,725 drug related homicides 
between 2006-2008. This figure increased to 34,612 deaths during 2006-2010. Between December 2008 and 
December 2010 drug related homicides spread to 195 municipalities that had previously been free from drug 
related homicides. 
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Impact on manufacturing 
Workers in the manufacturing industry experienced a decline in their remunerations in areas where 
cartels were active without drug related homicides. Also in areas that experienced at least one drug 
related homicide (Table 2, column 3).  
 The number of owners, workers and remunerations in this industry also declined in areas with 
the highest rates of drug related homicides, those in the 10 decile. (Table 2, panel B, column 1, 2 and 
3). In contrast, the number of owners increased in the areas in the first and third tertiles (column 2).  
 The increase in extortions and thefts that the most violent areas experienced could perhaps 
explain the decline in the number of owners in manufacturing, thus in remunerations. This decline in 
remunerations supports the findings of Velásquez (2014) who using a panel survey shows total 
earnings declined in areas with the highest homicide rates. It is less clear why the number of owners 
increased in areas with fewer drug related homicides. Migration of entrepreneurs from more to less 
violent areas is one possibility. 
 
Impact on retailing and wholesale business 
Cartels allegedly launder money in the industries of retailing and wholesale business (The Economist, 
2014). We cannot infer whether such allegations are true. However, our results reveal how resilient 
these industries have been in areas affected by cartels and drug violence. 
 In the areas where cartels were active without drug related homicides the number of owners 
and investment increased in the industry of wholesale business (Table 2, column 10 and 12). 
Remunerations in retailing also increased in these areas (column 7).  
 Similarly, in areas that experienced at least one drug related homicide, the number of owners, 
employees, and investment in retailing and wholesale business increased (Table 2, columns 5-12). The 
increase in investment, however, comes only from the areas that experienced the lowest drug related 
homicides rates (first and third tertiles). Investment in retailing even declined in areas with the highest 
drug related homicides rates. 
 
Impact on real state 
Major real state agencies argue that the drug violence has harmed them as people are reluctant to buy 
properties in affected areas (Sigler, 2012). Cartels have also allegedly harmed “legitimate” investors in 
real state by laundering money in this industry (CNN Expansión, 2010). We cannot ascertain whether 
these allegations are true. However, our findings fail to suggest a slow down of this industry in 
affected areas, relative to the control group.  
 For instance, we do not find any change in number of employees, owners, remunerations or 
investment in real state in areas where cartels were active without drug related homicides (Table 2, 
panel A, columns 13-16). In contrast, the number of owners increased in areas where there was at least 
one drug related homicide (Table 2, Panel B, column 14). The number of workers and owners also 
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increased in the municipalities with high levels of drug related homicides, within the third tertile 
(Table 2, panel B, columns 13 and 14). 
 
Impact on total tax revenue 
We analyse next the net change in tax revenue, as this statistic might reveal overall changes in the 
“legitimate” economy (Table 2 column 17). Tax revenue did not change among the areas where drug 
cartels have been active without drug related homicides. Tax revenue increased only in the areas with 
the lowest rates of drug related homicides (first tertile). This increase of tax revenue is consistent with 
the fall in unemployment rates in these areas, and with the increase in the number of employers in 
manufactures, retailing and wholesale business in these areas as well. All these changes could have 
been driven by employers migrating from more to less violent places.  
 In sum, we find no evidence of economic slowdown in the areas with the lowest  rates of drug 
related homicides that could explain its increase in poverty. As shown earlier, the population increased 
in areas least affected by the violence relative to their control group. So, population movements from 
more to less violent areas could perhaps have relocated poor people in the country. Population could 
have moved into areas least affected by drug related homicides despite of experiencing drug violence, 
given that they also improved their economy, relative to their control group (in terms of  
unemployment rates and tax revenue). 
 
7. Robustness checks 
7.1 Buffer areas 
In our earlier analysis of the impact of cartels and drug related homicides we excluded buffer areas to 
reduce the chances of effects spilling over to these areas. We set an arbitrary radius of 10 kilometres 
near treated areas. We also test the extent to which our estimators change when we vary the 
boundaries for the exclusion of buffer areas. Since most municipalities are geographically small, 
removing areas within a radius of 40 kilometres excludes about 90% of the control areas, resulting in 
too small a control group. Hence, we tested our main results excluding buffer areas within 15 and 20 
kilometres, finding very similar results. 
 For instance, Table A.9 presents the results of excluding buffer areas within a radius of 20 
kilometres. Setting this boundary excludes another 406 control areas. However, the patterns of 
inequality, poverty, migration and education remain the same as those presented earlier. 
 
7.2 Placebo tests   
We use placebo tests to assess the robustness of our findings. To this end, we randomly assign the 
areas used as control group to two placebo treatments. One treatment assumes that cartels were active 
in the area without drug related homicides. The second treatment assumes areas experienced drug 
related homicides. In this second treatment, we also assign different rates of drug related homicides, 
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according to the ones in fact experienced by treated areas. We produce these random placebo 
treatments so we remain with the same ratio of areas in the control and placebo treated as the one 
found between our treated and control areas.  
 We use probit regressions to estimate the propensity scores. As before, we assume the baseline 
period is 2000-2005 and the treatment period is 2006 or after. We use the same covariates in these 
regressions as before. The matched placebo and control areas have the same distribution of 
characteristics.  
 Table A.10 shows the placebo test finds 10 out of the 102 ATT coefficients statistically 
significant when analysing the impact on welfare statistics. That is a 10% rate likely to have been 
found by chance. Using the non-placebo data we found 23 out of 102 ATT coefficients statistically 
significant at 10% level.  
 Table A.11 shows the placebo test finds 10 out of the 106 ATT coefficients significant when 
analysing the impact on industries. That is a rate of 10% likely to have been found by chance. In 
contrast, we found 41 out of 106 ATT coefficients statistically using the non-placebo data.  
 
Second placebo test (using 1990-2000 as pre-treatment vs. 2001-2005 as post-treatment) 
We perform additional placebo tests. This time we assume that our treatment areas were affected by 
cartels or drug related homicides earlier than they were. We set this placebo treatment so the pre-
treatment period dates back to 1990-2000 and the post-treatment refers to 2001-2005. We use as 
control group the same areas as in our central analysis in Sections 5 and 6. 
 Table A.12 shows the results of this placebo test for our main welfare statistics of poverty, 
inequality, total population and human capital. From the 42 ATT presented, only two are statistically 
significant at 10% significance level. For the period 2000 vs. 2005 we do not have statistics on 
unemployment or electricity consumption. So we instead tested changes in GDP per capita finding that 
none turn statistically significant (hence not shown in the table). 
 In sum, all these placebo tests suggest the impacts showed earlier are unlikely to have been 
driven by chance or by unobserved characteristics. 
 
7.3 Changes in total homicides rates 2006-2010   
So far, we have evaluated the impact of areas experiencing extra homicides caused by the turf war 
among cartels and the state. A different research question would be to evaluate the impact of the 
change in the level of total homicides rates, whether drug related or not. This is also an important issue 
as there is the possibility that other homicides might have increased in areas where cartels hold battles. 
 For instance, Robles et al. have evaluated the impact on areas that experienced an increase by 
two or more standard deviations in their total homicide rates since 2006 with respect to their historical 
average. They found that 26.3% of the municipalities in the country experienced such an increase in 
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their total homicide rates. Using instrumental variables, these authors find that unemployment rates 
increased in these areas, as mentioned earlier. 
 We re-estimate the impact on all our statistics, following the definition of Robles et al. 
Specifically, we redefine treatment areas as those that experienced an increase of two or more standard 
deviations in the total homicides rates in any pair of years since 2006 with respect to the historical 
average homicide rate 1998-2005. The control group are those areas that experienced a smaller change 
in homicide rates than the treated. We test this impact with the same method we used before, 
difference-in-difference with kernel matching. 
 Tables 3 and 4 show the impact in areas that experienced an increase of two or more standard 
deviations in homicides rates on welfare statistics and key industries.  A problem with using this 
treatment definition is that it includes areas that experienced drug related homicides or cartels earlier 
than 2006. Hence, in these tables we also present the results of excluding areas that experienced cartels 
or drug related homicides during 2000-2005 and excluding from the control group buffer areas within 
a radius of 10 kilometres. Robles et al. did not exclude from their analysis neither of these areas.  
 Despite our differences in method and data sources used we find similar results to those of 
Robles et al. That is, unemployment rates increased (by 0.196 standard deviation) among the areas that 
experienced an increase of two or more standard deviations in their historic homicides rates. The 
increase in unemployment is even sharper when excluding buffer areas and those areas that had cartels 
or drug related homicides during 200-2005. Similarly, we do not find a change in the electricity 
consumption in these areas.  
 In addition, we do not find a change in poverty rates but we still find a harmful effect on 
education outcomes, and an increase in inequality (Table 4, Panel A, columns 1-9).  We find no 
impact on investment across the industries analysed or on tax revenue (Table 4). In contrast to our 
earlier results the number of workers and owners decreased in retailing (Table 5, columns 5-6). 
Similarly, the number of owners decreased for wholesale business, whilst we find no change in 
manufacturing.  
 The differences with the results we presented earlier are due to the differences in the areas 
being compared. Table 5 shows among the areas that experienced a jump in their total homicide rates 
the percentage that were used in our earlier analysis as treated, control or buffer areas. For instance, 
only 3.98% of the areas that experienced an increase of two-or more standard deviations from their 
historical homicide rates are within the top ten decile of areas with the highest drug related homicide 
rate. The other three tertile groups (the areas divided according to their drug related homicides rates) 
are evenly spread among those areas that experienced a sharp jump in their total homicides rates.  
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7.4 Impact on areas that experienced drug related homicides since 2001 
So far, we have estimated the impact for areas that experienced cartels or drug related homicides for 
the first time in 2006 or afterwards. This period is of particular importance as violence intensified to 
unprecedented levels and cartels expanded to areas that had not experienced cartels nor drug violence 
before. However, by focusing on this period we exclude from our analysis those areas that experienced 
violence since the beginning of the millennium, when the drug violence started.  
 In this sub-section we assess the impact on the areas that experienced drug related homicides, 
during 2000-2005. For this purpose, we redefine our treatment areas as those municipalities that were 
free of cartels and drug related homicides during 1990-2000 but that experienced drug related 
homicides during 2001-2005. The controls are areas that at no point experienced cartels or drug 
related homicides during 1990-2010. 
 We identified the areas where cartels were active with and without drug related homicides by 
surveying government and media reports. We estimate the impact of drug related homicides for all 
areas that experienced at least one drug related homicide, without subdividing this group further 
according to the intensity of violence. As before, we use difference-in-difference kernel matching to 
assess the impacts of cartels and their violence. We use roughly the same covariates as before to 
estimate the propensity score, but lagged for our new baseline period 2000.20  
 In Fig. 6 we show the matched treatment and control areas that satisfy the region of common 
support in the propensity score matching. None of these areas have statistically significant differences 
in covariates used to match them nor in the baseline characteristics. Fig. 7 shows that the matched 
areas had parallel trends in both homicides rates and poverty statistics before the violence erupted 
among cartels. 
 Table 6 shows that poverty increased in the areas that were affected by drug related homicides 
during 2001-2005, relative to their control group. The majority of these areas (86%) also experienced 
drug related homicides during 2006-2010. Poverty increased even more during that period, probably 
reflecting as well that the number of killings intensified. We also find a decline in the number of 
workers in manufacturing between 2000 and 2010.21 Thus, the overall impact on areas that were 
affected by drug violence since beginning of the new millennium are in line with our previous 
analysis, despite looking at an earlier start period and overall longer time frame. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Specifically we used, the 1990 marginalization index; 1990 Gini index; minimum distance to US border; 2000 
GDP per capita; 1990 population measured in logarithm; whether municipality was decentralized in 1998; trends 
in homicides rates 1990-1997.   
21
 For this group we did not find any other statistically significant impacts, hence we did not present them but are 
available on request. 
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8. Conclusion  
We quantified the impact of drug cartels and drug related homicides on development in Mexico. Using 
the difference-in-difference kernel matching, we found that inequality declined in areas where drug 
cartels were active without drug related homicides. These areas did not have any other impacts in 
terms of poverty, human capital, population size or economic activity, relative to their control group. 
We found a different picture for areas suffering drug related homicides. For instance, poverty 
increased in the areas that experienced both the highest and lowest rates of drug related homicides.  
 We adapted a theoretical model on poverty traps first proposed by Miguel and Roland (2011) 
to consider an economy with two industries: a formal and an illegal one (drugs). We used this model 
to show that although all our empirical findings refer to short-term impacts, some of them could 
persist in the long-run. Particularly so, for the case in poverty as we found a decline in human capital, 
number of employers, and jobs in some industries in the areas affected by drug violence. These areas 
then need urgent complementary policies to ensure that these negative impacts do not persist over 
time.  We showed that children are dropping out of school in these areas, despite not experiencing a 
decline in the number of schools or teachers per pupil population. Thus, likely reasons for school drop 
out are rises in poverty, engaging in drug trafficking and drug dependency.   
 These findings deepen our understanding of the effects drug cartels have on development, 
when engaging in violence and not. Policy implications as to whether and how to regulate drug 
markets are not obvious. However, this paper has contributed to the debate on what the priorities 
should be for policy makers to lessen the negative effects of drug trafficking and violence. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Fig.  1 Homicide rates in Mexico 2004-2012 
 
 
Fig. 2 Municipalities experiencing drug related homicides during 2000-2005 
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Fig. 3 Municipalities where cartels started operating for the first time in 2006 or after without drug 
related homicides vs. controls in region of common support 
 
 
Fig. 4 Municipalities that experienced drug related homicides for the first time in 2006 or after vs. 
controls in region of common support 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Illicit crops eradication  
 
Source: Ministry of National Defence (SEDENA), Mexico. 
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Table 1  
Impact of cartels and drug related homicides on welfare 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Food 
poverty
 
Capabilit
y poverty
Patrimon
y poverty Gini
Lived in 
another 
state 5 
years 
Lived in 
U.S. 5 
years 
ago
Total 
population
Aged 6-
14 out of 
school
Aged 15+ 
without 
primary
Population 
aged 6-14
Population 
aged 15-
17
Schools 
(primary to 
highschool) 
per pupil
Teachers 
(primary to 
highschool) 
per pupil
Total energy 
consumption
Energy 
consumption 
per capita
Unemployment 
rate 2000-2010
Number 
unemployed 
2000 vs 2010
Panel A: Cartels without drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.197 -0.186 -0.148 -0.391*** 0.169 -0.930 -0.030 0.052 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.029 0.029 -0.069 0.019 -0.358 -1.566
(0.150) (0.152) (0.156) (0.136) (0.205) (0.671) (0.044) (0.066) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024) (0.041) (0.059) (0.184) (0.087) (0.612) (1.144)
Observations 958 958 958 958 958 958 958 958 958 958 958 924 822 582 582 949 949
R-squared 0.072 0.057 0.033 0.148 0.343 0.356 0.098 0.403 0.902 0.053 0.254 0.202 0.224 0.065 0.018 0.540 0.351
Panel B: Drug related homicides
Areas with at least one drug related homicide 
ATT: time*treated -0.033 -0.028 -0.013 0.073 0.530* 0.725 0.080 0.093*** 0.032* 0.049** 0.033 -0.013 0.042 -0.370 -0.069 -0.347 -0.823
(0.053) (0.057) (0.071) (0.081) (0.299) (0.758) (0.050) (0.035) (0.017) (0.023) (0.032) (0.019) (0.028) (0.390) (0.128) (0.427) (1.822)
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,480 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,332 2,042 1,504 1,504 2,468 2,468
R-squared 0.052 0.029 0.004 0.179 0.089 0.502 0.112 0.404 0.893 0.015 0.213 0.117 0.209 0.015 0.008 0.605 0.414
Top 10 decile of drug related homicides 
ATT: time*treated 0.170* 0.156 0.105 -0.212 -0.105 0.103 0.010 0.005 0.013 -0.039*** -0.032** 0.059 -0.036 0.782* 3.574* -0.163 0.773
(0.093) (0.103) (0.134) (0.177) (0.131) (0.586) (0.030) -0.129 (0.031) (0.014) (0.014) (0.082) (0.103) (0.466) (1.996) (0.818) (1.023)
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,020 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 998 796 404 404 1,015 1,015
R-squared 0.073 0.062 0.055 0.177 0.313 0.424 0.062 0.224 0.843 0.175 0.054 0.078 0.112 0.063 0.287 0.575 0.331
Third tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.032 0.041 0.070 0.045 0.145 0.642 0.023 0.086 0.018 0.005 0.011 0.014 0.137*** -1.256 -0.319 0.557 1.182
(0.064) (0.067) (0.082) (0.101) (0.157) (0.694) (0.033) (0.053) (0.022) (0.015) (0.020) (0.031) (0.046) (0.852) (0.290) (0.481) (1.264)
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,374 1,160 766 766 1,420 1,420
R-squared 0.107 0.073 0.029 0.136 0.248 0.430 0.053 0.336 0.861 0.043 0.165 0.166 0.299 0.027 0.032 0.568 0.331
Second tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.089 -0.086 -0.056 0.035 0.577 -1.082 0.083* 0.096* 0.028 0.065** 0.024 -0.038 0.122** 0.481 -0.010 -0.106 0.264
(0.063) (0.066) (0.080) (0.111) (0.591) (0.823) (0.047) (0.050) (0.022) (0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.060) (0.671) (0.190) (0.489) (1.796)
Observations 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,178 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,134 1,038 750 750 1,172 1,172
R-squared 0.133 0.090 0.018 0.128 0.074 0.500 0.207 0.449 0.905 0.022 0.244 0.219 0.323 0.033 0.023 0.625 0.381
First tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.065 0.090 0.153* -0.050 1.556** 0.039 0.322** 0.113** 0.042* 0.151*** 0.158*** -0.035 0.001 -0.571 -0.396 -1.538** 1.373
(0.083) (0.083) (0.088) (0.144) (0.663) (0.867) (0.128) (0.054) (0.025) (0.057) (0.060) (0.025) (0.043) (0.407) (0.295) (0.691) (2.875)
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 682 670 570 570 718 718
R-squared 0.044 0.038 0.053 0.119 0.132 0.625 0.126 0.587 0.929 0.064 0.312 0.237 0.267 0.042 0.030 0.718 0.332
 
Controls used in specifications (1) to (15): poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two 
years. Controls used in specifications (16) and (17): poor-relief subsidies per capita and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 2 
Impact of drug cartels and drug related homicides on industries and tax revenue 
Tax revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment 
Panel A: Cartels without drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.153 0.024 -0.185** -0.996 0.156 0.105 0.239** 0.248 0.226 0.312* 0.010 0.558** 0.109 0.041 -0.234 -0.907 0.635
(0.151) (0.029) (0.080) (0.607) (0.132) (0.111) (0.102) (0.404) (0.253) (0.167) (0.179) (0.271) (0.114) (0.038) (0.340) (0.632) (0.610)
Observations 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348
R-squared 0.054 0.118 0.032 0.154 0.456 0.453 0.036 0.022 0.189 0.379 0.074 0.101 0.067 0.064 0.016 0.045 0.250
Panel B: Drug related homicides
Areas with at least one drug related homicide 
ATT: time*treated -0.074 0.037 -0.164** -0.320 0.243*** 0.219*** 0.061 0.356** 0.352*** 0.156** -0.054 1.138*** 0.129 0.046* -0.105 -0.063 0.328
(0.060) (0.024) (0.064) (0.250) (0.070) (0.066) (0.066) (0.174) (0.095) (0.077) (0.083) (0.394) (0.080) (0.025) (0.151) (0.253) (0.388)
Observations 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510
R-squared 0.027 0.039 0.023 0.042 0.368 0.367 0.039 0.011 0.095 0.272 0.012 0.015 0.028 0.039 0.010 0.002 0.079
Top 10 decile of drug related homicides 
ATT: time*treated -0.348* -0.108** -0.231* -0.034 0.292** 0.282** 0.032 -0.202* 0.361* 0.518 -0.088 0.073 0.041 -0.080 -0.224 -0.390 -0.380
(0.190) (0.046) (0.121) (0.097) (0.138) (0.139) (0.099) (0.119) (0.201) (0.363) (0.100) (0.122) (0.142) (0.082) (0.272) (0.239) (0.292)
Observations 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288
R-squared 0.056 0.021 0.105 0.057 0.317 0.370 0.078 0.057 0.101 0.216 0.025 0.034 0.021 0.095 0.023 0.012 0.122
Third tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.038 0.154* -0.156** -0.306 0.246** 0.292*** 0.058 0.348** 0.193 0.209* -0.078 1.121* 0.137*** 0.097*** -0.098 -0.014 -0.177
(0.087) (0.085) (0.066) (0.236) (0.105) (0.105) (0.068) (0.177) (0.120) (0.114) (0.128) (0.597) (0.048) (0.035) (0.166) (0.218) (0.297)
Observations 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792
R-squared 0.040 0.070 0.023 0.109 0.362 0.367 0.024 0.026 0.061 0.284 0.028 0.025 0.124 0.075 0.020 0.002 0.133
Second tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.118 0.069 -0.198*** -0.758** 0.204** 0.195* -0.025 0.359 0.440** 0.107 -0.124 0.425 0.314 0.144 -0.124 0.124 -0.302
(0.093) (0.064) (0.073) (0.346) (0.103) (0.107) (0.095) (0.235) (0.189) (0.118) (0.116) (0.304) (0.249) (0.111) (0.200) (0.397) (0.373)
Observations 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244
R-squared 0.085 0.133 0.050 0.123 0.372 0.354 0.073 0.020 0.091 0.285 0.024 0.051 0.044 0.119 0.019 0.004 0.178
First tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.064 0.036* -0.153 -2.356 0.294*** 0.213** 0.130 1.269** 0.524*** 0.176* 0.182 2.028* 0.189 0.020 -0.064 -0.463 3.846**
(0.123) (0.019) (0.133) (1.689) (0.103) (0.092) (0.098) (0.566) (0.163) (0.092) (0.130) (1.224) (0.139) (0.031) (0.225) (0.520) (1.897)
Observations 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046
R-squared 0.129 0.132 0.032 0.083 0.481 0.449 0.046 0.059 0.166 0.463 0.008 0.020 0.051 0.094 0.004 0.017 0.108
Manufactures Real EstateRetail trade Wholesale business
 
Controls used in all specifications: Poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3 
Impact on welfare statistics among municipalities that had two or more standard deviations increase in their total homicide rates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Food 
poverty
 Capability 
poverty
Patrimony 
poverty Gini
Lived in 
another 
state 5 
years ago
Lived in 
U.S. 5 
years ago
Total 
population
Aged 6-14 
out of 
school
Aged 15+ 
without 
primary
Population 
aged 6-14
Population 
aged 15-17
Schools 
(primary to 
highschool) 
per pupil
Teachers 
(primary to 
highschool) 
per pupil
Total energy 
consumption
Energy 
consumption 
per capita
Unemployment 
rate 2000-2010
Number 
unemployed 
2000 vs 2010
Panel A
ATT: time*treated 0.016 0.013 0.002 0.109*** 0.020 0.722*** 0.042** 0.043** -0.007 0.013 0.020* 0.012 0.023 0.059 0.040 0.196* 0.239
(0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.261) (0.017) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.036) (0.031) (0.100) (0.303)
Observations 4,764 4,764 4,764 4,758 4,764 4,764 4,764 4,764 4,764 4,764 4,764 4,516 3,868 2,848 2,848 4,732 4,732
R-squared 0.026 0.015 0.009 0.039 0.079 0.237 0.055 0.249 0.809 0.019 0.063 0.116 0.193 0.004 0.003 0.528 0.139
Panel B: Excluding buffer areas and municipalities that experienced cartels or drug-related homicides during 2000-2005
ATT: time*treated 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.089 0.128*** 0.803*** 0.042** 0.062** -0.009 0.028** 0.021* 0.004 0.001 0.052 0.029 0.638** 0.606*
(0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.057) (0.042) (0.275) (0.018) (0.029) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.026) (0.041) (0.049) (0.253) (0.345)
Observations 2,682 2,682 2,682 2,680 2,682 2,682 2,682 2,682 2,682 2,682 2,682 2,502 2,208 1,652 1,652 2,666 2,666
R-squared 0.042 0.025 0.005 0.041 0.072 0.333 0.060 0.279 0.855 0.022 0.099 0.118 0.228 0.013 0.004 0.542 0.160
 
Controls used in specifications (1) to (15): poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two 
years. Controls used in specifications (16) and (17): poor-relief subsidies per capita and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Table 4  
Impact on industries among municipalities that had two or more standard deviations increase in their total homicide rates 
Tax revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Panel A workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment 
ATT: time*treated -0.011 0.068 -0.033 0.011 -0.109***-0.118** -0.021 0.011 -0.031 -0.088* 0.042 0.022 -0.031 -0.040 -0.089* -0.066 0.014
(0.049) (0.101) (0.040) (0.060) (0.039) (0.047) (0.043) (0.057) (0.040) (0.052) (0.042) (0.044) (0.035) (0.028) (0.050) (0.129) (0.073)
Observations 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480 4,480
R-squared 0.016 0.038 0.015 0.005 0.247 0.288 0.051 0.003 0.025 0.201 0.020 0.008 0.053 0.039 0.004 0.015 0.047
Panel B: Excluding buffer areas and municipalities that experienced cartels or drug-related homicides during 2000-2005
ATT: time*treated 0.046 0.110 -0.013 0.113 -0.129** -0.113* -0.073 0.195 -0.042 -0.137* 0.015 0.057 -0.040 -0.025 -0.028 0.181 0.048
(0.086) (0.144) (0.047) (0.084) (0.060) (0.068) (0.064) (0.167) (0.062) (0.072) (0.047) (0.166) (0.046) (0.034) (0.055) (0.510) (0.143)
Observations 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710
R-squared 0.019 0.032 0.015 0.004 0.271 0.298 0.045 0.007 0.029 0.207 0.030 0.008 0.049 0.032 0.003 0.011 0.042
Wholesale business Real EstateManufactures Retail trade
 
Controls used in all specifications: poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 32 
Table 5 
Municipalities that had two or more standard deviations increase in historical homicide rates  
Observations Percentage
Used as controls no drug related homicides 2000-2010 167 16.2
1st Tertile of drug related homicides 2006-2010 124 12.03
2nd Tertile  of drug related homicides 2006-2010 123 11.93
3rd Tertile  of drug related homicides 2006-2010 123 11.93
10th Decile  of drug related homicides 2006-2010 41 3.98
Municipalities excluded from earlier analysis:
Had drug related homicides during 2000-2005 145 14.06
Areas (control or treated areas) had cartels operating during 2000-2005 108 10.47
Buffer areas, without drug related homicides 200 19.4
Total 1,031 100
According to Robles et al definition:                            
Had jump in total homicides rates by two or more 
standard deviations from historical average
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Fig. 6 Municipalities that experienced drug related homicides for the first time in 2001 or after vs. controls in region of common support 
 
 
Fig. 7 Homicide rates and food poverty in municipalities that experienced drug related homicides for the first time in 2001 or after vs. controls in region of 
common support 
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Table 6 
Impact on municipalities that experienced drug related homicides during 2000-2010 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Food 
poverty  
 
Capability 
poverty
Patrimony 
poverty Gini
Total 
population
Workers in 
manufactures
Food 
poverty
 Capability 
poverty
Patrimony 
poverty Gini
Total 
population
Unemployment 
rate 
Number 
unemployed 
Workers in 
manufactures
ATT: time*treated 0.174* 0.150 0.091 -0.123 0.001 -0.496 0.112* 0.106* 0.086 -0.075 -0.033 -1.012 -2.320 -0.745*
(0.101) (0.103) (0.105) (0.114) (0.042) (0.429) (0.066) (0.062) (0.059) (0.112) (0.082) (0.639) (1.753) (0.438)
Observations 672 672 672 672 672 636 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 636
R-squared 0.247 0.197 0.055 0.429 0.016 0.020 0.629 0.576 0.193 0.773 0.117 0.585 0.448 0.038
Changes 2000 vs. 2005 Changes 2000 vs. 2010
 
Excluding buffer areas. Controls used in all specifications: poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all 
lagged for 1998 and 2002. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1 
Drug related homicides 2006-2010 by State 
State
Total population 
2010
December 
2006
Jan-Dec 
2007
Jan-Dec 
2008
Jan-Dec 
2009
Jan-Dec 
2010
Drug related 
homicides 
2006-2010
Contribution to 
national drug 
related homicides 
2006-2010
Aguascalientes 1,191,091 0 37 38 31 46 152 0.4%
Baja California 3,173,198 8 209 778 484 540 2,019 5.8%
Baja California Sur 644,860 0 6 2 1 10 19 0.1%
Campeche 825,716 0 8 7 6 10 31 0.1%
Chiapas 4,819,742 0 57 82 88 77 304 0.9%
Chihuahua 3,414,751 1 244 2,118 3,345 4,427 10,135 29.3%
Coahuila 2,758,418 0 18 78 179 384 659 1.9%
Colima 653,431 0 2 12 33 101 148 0.4%
Distrito Federal 
(Mexico City) 8,798,672 1 182 144 135 191 653 1.9%
Durango 1,637,236 0 108 276 674 834 1,892 5.5%
Guanajuato 5,507,486 0 51 79 234 152 516 1.5%
Guerrero 3,390,421 12 299 412 879 1,137 2,739 7.9%
Hidalgo 2,676,778 0 43 38 34 52 167 0.5%
Jalisco 7,374,128 1 70 148 261 593 1,073 3.1%
México 4,357,209 0 111 364 440 623 1,538 4.4%
Michoacán 1,781,476 24 328 289 590 520 1,751 5.1%
Morelos 15,200,000 0 32 48 114 335 529 1.5%
Nayarit 1,089,174 0 11 28 37 377 453 1.3%
Nuevo León 4,664,076 4 130 105 112 620 971 2.8%
Oaxaca 3,808,686 0 62 122 87 167 438 1.3%
Puebla 5,794,763 0 6 22 28 51 107 0.3%
Querétaro 1,836,171 0 5 6 13 13 37 0.1%
Quintana Roo 1,341,166 0 26 29 32 64 151 0.4%
San Luis Potosí 2,588,808 0 10 34 8 135 187 0.5%
Sinaloa 2,772,029 3 426 1,084 1,059 1,815 4,387 12.7%
Sonora 2,670,440 5 141 252 365 495 1,258 3.6%
Tabasco 2,246,282 1 27 35 65 73 201 0.6%
Tamaulipas 3,278,354 0 80 96 90 1,209 1,475 4.3%
Tlaxcala 1,176,409 0 0 3 6 4 13 0.0%
Veracruz 7,647,431 1 75 65 133 179 453 1.3%
Yucatán 1,957,360 1 4 18 1 2 26 0.1%
Zacatecas 1,493,518 0 18 25 50 37 130 0.4%
Total 112,569,280 62 2,826 6,837 9,614 15,273 34,612 100%
Drug related homicides
 
Source: Population INEGI (2012). Drug related homicides SNSP (2011). 
 
 
Fig. A.1 Rate of drug related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants by tertiles and 10th decile 
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Table A.2 
Probit marginal effects: Propensity scores used to match areas and evaluate impact on welfare statistics 
Cartels but no drug-
related homicides
At least one drug 
related homicide 10th decile 3rd Tertile 2nd Tertile 1st Tertile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index of marginalization 2000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
Capability poverty, 2000 -0.010** -0.028*** -0.006 -0.023*** -0.004
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
Food poverty, 2000 0.009* 0.021** 0.005 0.018** -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.000)
Decentralized, 2005 -0.053** 0.070* 0.001 -0.027 0.012 -0.018
(0.025) (0.039) (0.015) (0.047) (0.035) (0.020)
Mixed type municipality (urban/rural) -0.059*** -0.052 -0.020 -0.063 0.002 -0.004
(0.017) (0.056) (0.016) (0.049) (0.043) (0.004)
Mixed type*Decentralized 0.039 0.102 0.242** 0.085
(0.065) (0.088) (0.106) (0.076)
Rural*Distance to north border -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Population 2005 0.045 -0.017 0.016 0.043 0.594*** 0.167*
(0.096) (0.177) (0.049) (0.172) (0.185) (0.101)
Squared log population -0.000 0.015 -0.001 0.003 -0.024*** -0.007*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004)
Log GDP per capita 2005 0.015 0.170** 0.017 0.122 0.003 0.000
(0.038) (0.078) (0.024) (0.075) (0.056) (0.008)
%Children school attendance 2005 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Remmittances 0.002 0.011*** 0.004** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000)
Squared remmitances -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Municipality ruled by PAN only 0.001 -0.112** -0.013 -0.082** -0.043 -0.005
(0.023) (0.049) (0.011) (0.038) (0.030) (0.006)
Municipality ruled by PRI only -0.029 -0.011 -0.003 -0.077* -0.017 -0.003
(0.022) (0.048) (0.014) (0.043) (0.032) (0.005)
Homicide rate*decentralized 2005 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Total homicide rate 1990 0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1991 -0.001
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1993 0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1995 -0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1996 0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1997 0.001**
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1999 0.001*
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 2000 -0.001
(0.001)
Total homicide rate 2001 -0.000
(0.001)
Total homicide rate 2003 -0.003***
(0.001)
Total homicide rate 2004 0.001 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Squared Homicide rate 2004 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to pacific coast -0.000***
(0.000)
Miniumum distance to north border -0.000*
(0.000)
Squared distance to north border 0.000
(0.000)
Dummy, by pacific coast or not 0.320* 0.243 0.094
(0.167) (0.165) (0.097)
Minimum distance to any border 
(north, south, pacific coast) -56.790** -43.642**
(24.307) (20.249)
Decentralized*Minimum distance to 
any border (north, south, pacific 
coast) 0.000
(0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.40 0.48 0.40 0.48 0.63
Observations 653 1,368 659 815 810 823
Drug related homicides by sub-groups
 
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the 
underlying coefficient being 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Fig. A.2 Distribution of propensity scores between treatment and control groups 
 
Fig. A.3 Trends in homicides rates between treatment and controls after kernel matching 
 
 
Fig. A.4 Trends in food poverty between treatment and controls after kernel matching 
 
 
Fig. A.5 Trends in marginalization index between treatment and controls after kernel matching  
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Table A.3 
Balancing test for covariates used to estimate propensity score to assess the impact on welfare statistics 
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Index of marginalization 2000 38.47 38.61 0.924 36.2 36.81 0.594 35.81 32.71 0.138 37.17 36.63 0.681 36.95 36.93 0.985 36.68 37.45 0.694
Capability poverty, 2000 47.96 49.97 0.555 45.1 45.24 0.947 37.1 32.25 0.215 46.23 44.75 0.568 46.74 46.26 0.852
Food poverty, 2000 40.93 42.9 0.554 37.87 38.18 0.874 31.12 26.49 0.204 39.11 37.88 0.619 39.31 38.9 0.867 41.68 42.6 0.722
Decentralized, 2005 0.36 0.36 0.937 0.47 0.5 0.611 0.61 0.52 0.351 0.46 0.47 0.825 0.44 0.42 0.666 0.42 0.5 0.417
Mixed type municipality (urban/rural) 0.26 0.25 0.968 0.33 0.32 0.847 0.23 0.31 0.413 0.34 0.34 0.983 0.35 0.33 0.86 0.29 0.23 0.41
Mixed type*Decentralized 0.06 0.04 0.616 0.11 0.07 0.428 0.1 0.1 0.843 0.12 0.09 0.4
Rural*Distance to north border 391.16 392.91 0.975 382.82 379.26 0.922 327.47 299.94 0.646 412.18 390.3 0.641 408.48 371.93 0.45
Log Population 2005 9.25 9.3 0.736 9.69 9.62 0.502 8.71 8.45 0.182 9.23 9.16 0.568 9.68 9.7 0.867 10.48 10.45 0.762
Squared log population 86.73 87.74 0.727 94.96 93.64 0.498 77.2 72.62 0.168 86.29 84.98 0.542 94.36 94.74 0.853 110.41 109.56 0.689
Log GDP per capita 2005 10.8 10.79 0.872 10.84 10.85 0.689 10.92 11.01 0.141 10.82 10.86 0.409 10.8 10.83 0.552 10.81 10.78 0.536
Children school attendance 2005 64.07 63.78 0.679 63.59 63.24 0.494 62.61 64.21 0.18 63.52 63.63 0.852 64.04 63.87 0.801
Remmitances 7.73 7.41 0.819 8.48 8.47 0.994 10.05 9.26 0.611 9.89 9.72 0.879 7.6 7.87 0.78 6.08 5.71 0.678
Squared remmittances 146.93 140.4 0.884 173.25 153.77 0.639 183.38 177.91 0.875 119.19 120.08 0.971
Municipality ruled by PAN only 0.37 0.38 0.908 0.26 0.28 0.801 0.21 0.2 0.82 0.23 0.27 0.487 0.26 0.27 0.796 0.35 0.32 0.727
Municipality ruled by PRI only 0.41 0.41 0.995 0.49 0.53 0.452 0.56 0.59 0.694 0.47 0.44 0.626 0.48 0.52 0.589 0.46 0.49 0.739
Homicide rate*decentralized 2005 2.56 2.68 0.924 11.52 5.98 0.159 6.84 6.76 0.961 3.96 3.05 0.333 2.66 3 0.67
Homicide rate1990 11.24 11.54 0.896
Homicide rate1991 10.06 10.73 0.773
Homicide rate1993 10.97 11.18 0.928
Homicide rate1995 11.69 11.57 0.956
Homicide rate1996 10.86 10.32 0.827
Homicide rate1997 13.55 13.04 0.894
Homicide rate1999 10.73 10.96 0.929
Homicide rate2000 7.16 7 0.912
Homicide rate2001 6.77 6.32 0.746
Homicide rate2003 3.91 3.86 0.952
Homicide rate 2004 16.39 11.48 0.241 12.54 12.11 0.826 8.87 8.34 0.699 6.48 6.33 0.887
Squared homicide rate 2004 1088.34 576.07 0.355 510.43 471.61 0.779 221.85 199.1 0.703
Distance to pacific coast 287.01 269.5 0.599
Distance to north border 480.84 448.17 0.583
Squared distance to north border 338745.1 306080.1 0.595
By pacific coast 0.03 0.02 0.622 0.03 0.02 0.67 0.03 0.02 0.325
Minimum distance to any border (north, 
south, pacific coast) 0 0 0.707 0 0 0.519
Decentralized*Distance north border 331.51 367.39 0.591
1st Tertile
Panel A: Cartels without drug 
related homicides                
Panel B: Drug related homicides
All that experienced at least one-
drug related homicide 10th Decile 3rd Tertile 2nd Tertile
 
Sources: Decentralized, own estimates using official electoral results. Data on distances own estimates using geo-coding provided by INEGI. Rest of 
indicators from INEGI. 
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Table A.4 
Descriptive statistics of welfare statistics across matched areas that fall in the region of common support  
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Food poverty 32.10 33.69 32.69 34.48 -0.179 29.90 28.86 29.44 28.33 -0.017 26.95 17.38 26.18 24.29 0.206**
(13.49) (17.25) (17.19) (19.09) (0.151) (11.83) (14.20) (15.85) (16.09) (0.052) (11.38) (8.510) (17.26) (17.32) (0.096)
Capability poverty 40.93 42.17 42.27 43.83 -0.167 38.42 37.20 38.76 37.28 -0.013 34.66 24.42 34.90 32.18 0.208**
(14.04) (17.67) (18.21) (20.16) (0.153) (12.63) (15.10) (16.99) (17.48) (0.056) (12.38) (9.925) (18.81) (19.17) (0.105)
Patrimony poverty 63.97 64.12 67.09 67.58 -0.127 61.26 59.97 63.94 61.82 -0.004 56.25 47.27 59.97 55.46 0.198
(12.78) (15.79) (16.36) (18.17) (0.156) (12.21) (14.65) (15.81) (16.76) (0.069) (12.51) (12.33) (17.96) (19.23) (0.134)
Gini 42.27 44.11 41.84 41.84 -0.338** 43.03 42.93 41.24 42.17 0.112 42.94 43.74 40.33 41.95 -0.178
(3.845) (3.111) (3.899) (4.246) (0.131) (3.616) (3.767) (3.822) (4.010) (0.092) (3.526) (4.080) (3.308) (3.574) (0.262)
Lived in another state 5 years ago 232.8 365.3 361.0 432.4 0.088 316.5 391.8 473.7 622.9 0.309* 115.4 118.1 192.9 180.4 -0.109
(289.0) (447.5) (434.6) (572.5) (0.123) (342.5) (584.6) (518.9) (1491.9) (0.164) (135.3) (148.2) (239.1) (194.5) (0.101)
Lived in U.S. 5 years ago 53.32 53.50 260.6 211.7 -1.035 83.56 89.21 378.4 419.6 0.642 54.90 58.83 258.6 250.7 0.182
(82.20) (72.20) (340.8) (311.5) (0.754) (103.4) (107.3) (410.1) (424.8) (0.769) (68.60) (56.37) (287.0) (255.3) (0.693)
Total population 20598.9 25898.0 21343.9 21527.1 -0.033 25617.8 29047.7 27137.2 29778.1 0.052 10071.6 12349.1 11972.4 13220.8 0.017
(17006.1) (19482.7) (18732.3) (17777.5) (0.036) (20260.1) (24366.6) (22240.7) (27257.5) (0.036) (9206.6) (12129.3) (13381.3) (11696.7) (0.026)
Aged 6-14 out of school 5.922 5.113 5.073 5.205 0.036 5.933 6.807 4.876 6.012 0.081** 7.393 7.639 5.802 6.796 0.011
(2.454) (2.041) (2.666) (2.884) (0.063) (2.300) (3.593) (2.431) (3.389) (0.035) (2.602) (4.555) (3.081) (3.815) (0.118)
Aged 15+ without primary 42.10 37.82 36.57 35.51 -0.001 39.18 36.92 34.03 33.45 0.030** 43.31 37.46 37.30 34.37 -0.015
(8.961) (9.489) (9.137) (9.911) (0.020) (8.706) (10.36) (8.912) (9.918) (0.015) (8.079) (11.02) (9.007) (9.954) (0.036)
Population aged 6-14 4409.1 5587.5 4290.9 4456.5 0.002 5498.0 6098.2 5374.5 5897.4 0.040** 2129.4 2432.4 2313.7 2445.3 -0.035***
(3759.4) (4372.5) (3851.7) (3915.1) (0.014) (4444.7) (5245.6) (4482.6) (5442.1) (0.018) (2090.8) (2390.7) (2730.0) (2190.9) (0.013)
Population aged 15-17 1403.3 1769.5 1472.1 1509.3 0.002 1728.8 1949.9 1832.8 2006.6 0.033 681.4 796.3 784.9 852.5 -0.022*
(1183.0) (1341.8) (1293.7) (1321.5) (0.021) (1368.9) (1646.3) (1491.3) (1799.8) (0.025) (641.3) (778.8) (906.8) (769.0) (0.012)
Schools (primary to highschool) per 
pupil 103.8 110.5 110.2 116.7 -0.025 101.2 89.12 106.0 97.67 -0.010 158.5 125.7 148.2 142.3 0.126*
(57.07) (58.91) (57.99) (56.59) (0.038) (50.89) (48.45) (52.03) (52.26) (0.019) (69.41) (73.43) (65.39) (74.59) (0.075)
Teachers (primary to highschool) 
per pupil 304.4 320.8 327.7 338.3 0.023 292.5 285.3 313.1 313.5 0.044* 319.2 336.3 335.9 348.5 0.020
(62.27) (79.18) (78.18) (86.60) (0.056) (60.58) (66.33) (72.51) (73.33) (0.025) (54.98) (75.24) (74.26) (74.04) (0.084)
Total energy consumption 
(thousands of pesos) 16.93 19.02 20.46 15.44 -0.035 22.11 34.52 29.89 30.78 -0.162 10.31 24.37 13.84 28.26 0.321*
(17.99) (17.98) (34.62) (19.45) (0.075) (21.91) (89.55) (43.85) (71.18) (0.153) (10.39) (50.08) (30.80) (52.39) (0.194)
Energy consumption per capita 11093.0 8095.9 8941.7 6849.9 0.010 10089.5 11581.1 11283.1 10230.7 -0.050 23157.4 16368.3 9118.4 20360.9 1.121
(24862.5) (6100.4) (13493.7) (4989.8) (0.054) (15809.8) (24775.6) (19593.8) (19200.8) (0.079) (47905.7) (21774.4) (8947.0) (41133.6) (0.757)
Unemployment rate 2000-2010 0.808 0.990 4.188 3.906 -0.263 0.969 1.153 4.738 4.631 -0.205 1.123 1.152 4.642 5.023 -0.258
(0.474) (0.607) (3.303) (3.122) (0.418) (0.488) (0.694) (3.178) (2.564) (0.302) (0.616) (0.792) (2.891) (2.551) (0.625)
Number unemployed 2000 vs 2010 50.17 66.69 322.4 267.8 -1.114 70.01 98.06 494.3 476.7 -0.499 29.37 54.64 199.4 234.6 0.641
(53.62) (55.91) (420.7) (271.7) (0.730) (72.41) (105.0) (576.2) (483.0) (1.183) (27.57) (80.05) (276.5) (258.3) (0.605)
Number municipalities 409 70 554 688 441 70
2005 2010 2005 2010ATT           
(no 
controls)
Panel A: Cartels no drug-related homicides At least one drug-related homicides 10th Decile
Panel B: Drug-related homicides
ATT           
(no 
controls)
ATT           
(no 
controls)
2005 2010
 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) estimated with kernel matching and no controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A.4 (continuation) 
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Food poverty 29.31 28.71 29.13 29.32 0.051 31.77 31.54 29.65 28.48 -0.092 33.48 29.57 30.74 30.91 0.063
(11.59) (13.41) (16.00) (16.69) (0.064) (11.79) (13.96) (15.26) (14.81) (0.063) (11.17) (13.80) (14.69) (15.81) (0.079)
Capability poverty 37.68 37.08 38.40 38.33 0.063 40.45 40.14 39.03 37.70 -0.086 42.72 38.17 40.36 40.31 0.085
(12.53) (14.49) (17.34) (17.83) (0.067) (12.46) (14.48) (16.35) (16.06) (0.065) (11.26) (14.82) (15.21) (16.96) (0.079)
Patrimony poverty 60.35 60.00 63.55 62.87 0.093 63.16 62.88 64.25 62.86 -0.046 66.15 61.20 65.80 65.07 0.141
(12.38) (14.69) (16.27) (16.33) (0.081) (11.67) (13.03) (15.02) (15.15) (0.076) (9.535) (14.73) (12.84) (15.78) (0.090)
Gini 42.93 42.23 41.37 42.06 0.063 43.44 42.64 41.85 41.85 0.065 43.48 43.41 41.93 42.54 -0.022
(3.867) (3.487) (3.667) (4.373) (0.104) (3.636) (3.675) (3.758) (3.792) (0.104) (3.156) (3.682) (4.053) (3.951) (0.118)
Lived in another state 5 years ago 221.1 245.9 313.4 412.2 0.091 291.2 512.7 436.2 686.5 0.325 535.2 1262.4 785.3 1712.9 1.233**
(266.2) (307.2) (388.0) (692.6) (0.089) (297.0) (2365.5) (445.2) (3258.6) (0.336) (408.4) (4325.3) (601.4) (5274.8) (0.528)
Lived in U.S. 5 years ago 64.16 80.14 295.6 360.5 0.740 75.88 77.35 377.0 318.5 -0.997 108.0 117.8 580.0 566.5 0.026
(81.88) (101.1) (341.2) (389.4) (0.683) (92.33) (117.2) (404.7) (333.5) (0.879) (122.2) (170.3) (516.2) (597.2) (1.677)
Total population 17930.0 20410.0 18196.6 20913.4 0.013 23677.6 27391.5 25233.9 25878.2 0.054 40733.0 59486.7 43967.9 60983.3 0.273**
(15463.5) (18905.1) (17503.4) (22147.9) (0.025) (16704.9) (28936.7) (19328.7) (29326.3) (0.038) (19927.6) (104487.0) (20996.6) (111040.5) (0.113)
Aged 6-14 out of school 6.277 6.812 5.197 6.152 0.066 5.855 6.615 5.008 5.453 0.072 5.819 6.412 5.141 5.818 0.102*
(2.559) (4.452) (2.558) (3.994) (0.051) (2.295) (2.642) (2.322) (2.258) (0.045) (1.966) (2.859) (2.223) (3.125) (0.057)
Aged 15+ without primary 41.40 38.02 36.03 35.00 0.012 39.85 37.10 34.35 33.49 0.019 37.46 35.60 32.48 32.19 0.036*
(9.231) (10.36) (9.079) (9.791) (0.019) (8.455) (11.58) (8.266) (10.41) (0.018) (7.532) (10.54) (7.844) (10.52) (0.020)
Population aged 6-14 3776.5 4212.1 3606.7 4212.7 0.003 5095.5 5583.4 5001.5 5048.9 0.051** 8862.5 11998.9 8839.9 11422.7 0.143***
(3399.1) (3930.5) (3550.8) (4403.4) (0.011) (3745.9) (5624.1) (3958.5) (5529.9) (0.024) (4389.3) (17648.3) (4281.4) (16664.0) (0.053)
Population aged 15-17 1208.0 1373.6 1243.3 1450.2 0.011 1609.4 1797.5 1722.2 1718.8 0.023 2768.1 3830.3 3005.4 3862.0 0.148**
(1059.7) (1279.4) (1192.4) (1508.6) (0.016) (1152.4) (1825.9) (1325.8) (1818.9) (0.026) (1349.7) (5947.1) (1419.9) (5799.2) (0.059)
Schools (primary to highschool) per 
pupil 109.2 95.71 113.4 106.2 0.026 97.51 89.15 102.3 98.20 -0.024 85.19 75.75 87.67 81.87 -0.028
(57.71) (54.23) (54.68) (58.05) (0.031) (46.67) (47.97) (47.57) (50.33) (0.022) (37.96) (34.35) (39.27) (37.53) (0.019)
Teachers (primary to highschool) 
per pupil 304.8 295.7 327.1 332.3 0.134*** 294.9 285.1 313.2 317.1 0.091** 283.8 266.9 292.4 289.7 0.012
(59.09) (76.84) (70.31) (75.22) (0.041) (61.22) (61.19) (66.31) (74.54) (0.037) (56.18) (54.19) (60.12) (64.63) (0.024)
Total energy consumption 
(thousands of pesos) 17.38 32.96 24.76 19.83 -0.509 20.13 25.23 28.00 31.11 0.154 33.29 88.28 48.86 73.06 -0.260
(18.79) (132.8) (47.42) (59.95) (0.347) (18.88) (63.79) (43.37) (114.3) (0.236) (23.42) (252.2) (48.63) (211.0) (0.205)
Energy consumption per capita 12079.5 13323.2 12277.3 8655.6 -0.203 9048.7 7438.7 10233.1 7972.5 -0.009 8570.7 10970.5 11058.4 9346.1 -0.069
(21223.0) (42053.7) (23236.6) (14517.2) (0.182) (9866.2) (6460.0) (16759.4) (16733.0) (0.066) (6022.1) (17137.6) (14647.6) (11679.3) (0.055)
Unemployment rate 2000-2010 0.919 1.256 4.271 4.991 0.412 0.927 1.191 4.630 4.838 -0.034 0.995 1.138 5.020 4.400 -0.859**
(0.525) (0.878) (2.994) (2.853) (0.325) (0.455) (0.689) (3.127) (2.853) (0.326) (0.426) (0.609) (2.884) (2.127) (0.392)
Number unemployed 2000 vs 2010 47.27 78.68 295.2 369.8 0.672 62.27 104.2 436.0 469.3 0.276 113.0 210.3 834.5 972.9 1.018
(50.53) (100.3) (390.5) (444.2) (0.682) (54.89) (183.9) (477.8) (636.0) (1.097) (81.81) (495.0) (637.7) (1867.2) (2.455)
Number municipalities 532 182 428 162 162 202
3rd Tertile
Panel B: Drug-related homicides
1st Tertile2nd Tertile
2005 2010 2005 ATT           
(no 
controls)
ATT           
(no 
controls)
ATT           
(no 
controls)
2010 2005 2010
 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) estimated with kernel matching and no controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A.5 
Number of municipalities included as control and treated to measure impact of welfare statistics by state 
 Number 
municipalities
Excluded from 
analysisa
Excluded for 
being buffer 
area Treated Control
Treated in 
common 
support
Control in 
common 
support
% Municipalities 
analysed in 
treatment an control 
in common support
Excluded 
from 
analysisb
Excluded for 
being buffer 
area Treated Control
Treated in 
common 
support
Control in 
common 
support
% Municipalities 
analysed in 
treatment an 
control in 
common support
Aguascalientes 11 10 1 0 0 0 0 0% 2 1 8 0 7 0 64%
Baja California 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0% 5 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Baja California Sur 5 4 0 1 0 1 0 20% 3 0 2 0 0 0 0%
Campeche 11 5 0 1 5 1 5 55% 4 0 2 5 1 5 55%
Chiapas 118 57 25 8 28 8 22 25% 28 25 37 28 35 28 53%
Chihuahua 67 61 2 1 3 1 3 6% 19 2 43 3 38 3 61%
Coahuila 38 23 2 8 5 7 4 29% 18 2 13 5 7 5 32%
Colima 10 9 0 0 1 0 1 10% 3 0 6 1 5 1 60%
Distrito Federal (Mexico City) 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 0% 16 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Durango 39 35 1 1 2 1 2 8% 22 1 14 2 14 2 41%
Guanajuato 46 37 2 4 3 3 3 13% 8 2 33 3 18 3 46%
Guerrero 81 72 5 2 2 1 0 1% 32 5 42 2 39 1 49%
Hidalgo 84 38 28 3 15 3 13 19% 3 28 38 15 32 14 55%
Jalisco 125 94 12 11 8 9 8 14% 22 12 83 8 68 8 61%
Michoacán 113 102 11 0 0 0 0 0% 50 11 52 0 50 0 44%
Morelos 33 31 2 0 0 0 0 0% 19 1 13 0 0 0 0%
México 125 101 20 1 3 1 3 3% 40 20 62 3 53 3 45%
Nayarit 20 16 2 0 2 0 1 5% 2 2 14 2 11 2 65%
Nuevo León 51 37 5 5 4 5 4 18% 22 5 20 4 16 4 39%
Oaxaca 570 138 205 4 223 4 98 18% 54 205 88 223 87 202 51%
Puebla 217 42 85 4 86 4 65 32% 7 85 39 86 35 84 55%
Querétaro 18 10 2 0 6 0 6 33% 3 1 8 6 5 6 61%
Quintana Roo 9 6 0 2 1 2 1 33% 4 0 4 1 1 1 22%
San Luis Potosí 58 24 10 2 22 2 22 41% 4 10 22 22 19 22 71%
Sinaloa 18 18 0 0 0 0 0 0% 16 0 2 0 0 0 0%
Sonora 72 47 4 4 17 4 17 29% 20 4 31 17 28 17 63%
Tabasco 17 15 1 1 0 1 0 6% 7 1 9 0 6 0 35%
Tamaulipas 43 33 2 2 6 2 4 14% 20 2 15 6 13 5 42%
Tlaxcala 60 8 46 0 6 0 6 10% 0 46 8 6 6 6 20%
Veracruz 212 98 75 2 37 2 37 18% 27 75 73 37 71 37 51%
Yucatán 106 5 9 5 87 5 74 75% 7 9 3 87 2 85 82%
Zacatecas 58 31 14 3 10 3 10 22% 8 14 26 10 21 10 53%
Total 2,456 1,228 571 75 582 70 409 20% 495 569 810 582 688 554 51%
Panel A: Experienced drug-cartels for the first time after 2006 but no drug-related 
homicides vs. controls Panel B: Experienced drug related homicides for the first time after 2006 vs. controls
 
a Excluded if had drug related homicides during 2000-2010 or if had cartels operating in municipality before 2006. bExcluded if had cartels or drug related 
homicides during 2000-2005. Also excluded if municipality experienced drug related homicides after 2006 according to media but not to official statistics. 
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Table A.6  
Probit marginal effects: Propensity scores used to match areas and evaluate impact on industries 
Cartels without 
drug related 
homicides
At least one drug 
related homicide 10th decile 3rd Tertile 2nd Tertile 1st Tertile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decentralized, 2005 -0.001 0.127*** 0.038*** 0.026 0.001 0.014
(0.005) (0.033) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.021)
Mixed type municipality (urban/rural) -0.006 -0.025 -0.010 0.009 0.001 -0.074***
(0.005) (0.044) (0.009) (0.028) (0.003) (0.018)
Rural*Distance to north border -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Population 2005 0.011* -0.000 0.029 0.281*** 0.069*
(0.006) (0.167) (0.031) (0.086) (0.041)
Log GDP per capita 2005 0.019* 0.322*** 0.035** 0.090** 0.014 0.078**
(0.011) (0.071) (0.016) (0.036) (0.011) (0.037)
%Children school attendance 2005 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Remmittances 0.000 0.006*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.001 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Municipality ruled by PAN only 0.003 -0.053 -0.006 0.005 -0.003 0.065**
(0.005) (0.039) (0.006) (0.021) (0.003) (0.030)
Municipality ruled by PRI only -0.001 0.045 0.010 0.021 0.000 0.038
(0.005) (0.041) (0.010) (0.021) (0.002) (0.026)
Total homicide rate 2004 0.000 0.001*** 0.001* 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Homicide rate*decentralized 2005 -0.001 -0.001* -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Total homicide rate 1991 0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1993 -0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1995 0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1996 0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 1999 -0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 2000 -0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 2001 -0.000
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 2003 0.000
(0.000)
Index of marginalization 2000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.007***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Capability poverty, 2000 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008** 0.001 0.016***
(0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Food poverty, 2000 0.006 0.001 0.008* -0.001 -0.015***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Squared log population 0.012 -0.002 -0.012*** -0.003*
(0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Mixed type*Decentralized 0.014 0.075 0.001 0.072
(0.026) (0.052) (0.004) (0.055)
Squared remmitances -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Squared Homicide rate 2004 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy, by pacific coast or not 0.020 0.071
(0.040) (0.064)
Miniumum distance to north border -0.000
(0.000)
Minimum distance to any border (north, 
south, pacific coast) -10.447
(10.566)
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.35 0.27 0.26 0.43 0.27
Observations 965 1,401 973 1,066 1,068 1,069
Drug related homicides by sub-groups
 
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, z and P>|z| correspond to the test of 
the underlying coefficient being 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Fig. A.6 Distribution of propensity scores between treatment and control groups  
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Table A.7  
Balancing test for covariates used to estimate propensity score to assess the impact on industries 
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Mean 
treated
Mean 
controls
p-value for 
diff
Index of marginalization 2000 35.12 35.11 0.992 37.09 36.27 0.68 34.39 34.17 0.866 34.43 34.24 0.891 31.1 31.99 0.567
Capability poverty, 2000 44.4 44.11 0.856 41.73 39.79 0.642 41.68 40.91 0.752 45.1 45.16 0.977 41.86 45.25 0.144
Food poverty, 2000 37.11 36.95 0.921 35.58 33.72 0.637 34.94 34.37 0.807 37.39 37.45 0.979 34.06 37.26 0.158
Decentralized, 2005 0.4 0.31 0.302 0.49 0.52 0.549 0.71 0.7 0.958 0.52 0.48 0.407 0.39 0.42 0.555 0.47 0.47 0.906
Mixed type municipality (urban/rural) 0.23 0.23 0.907 0.32 0.31 0.76 0.17 0.13 0.525 0.4 0.43 0.68 0.29 0.27 0.761 0.27 0.24 0.541
Mixed type*Decentralized 0.1 0.08 0.676 0.2 0.18 0.683 0.11 0.1 0.934 0.13 0.11 0.606
Rural*Distance to north border 361.17 321.72 0.604 357.37 361.06 0.907 386.3 386.06 0.997 341.39 319.2 0.604 379.04 373.27 0.909 237.05 258.83 0.609
Log Population 2005 10.01 9.88 0.489 9.86 9.81 0.57 8.57 8.41 0.364 9.59 9.52 0.432 10.08 10.1 0.809
Squared log population 98.16 97.27 0.58 74.53 71.93 0.381 92.93 91.36 0.401 102.04 102.4 0.829
Log GDP per capita 2005 10.91 10.91 0.996 10.87 10.87 0.888 10.92 10.94 0.742 10.9 10.9 0.887 10.87 10.88 0.876 11 10.95 0.334
Children school attendance 2005 64.37 64.06 0.719 63.69 63.54 0.728 62.61 63.15 0.568 63.63 63.46 0.763 64.37 63.8 0.366 64.27 63.87 0.541
Remmittances 7.73 7.66 0.957 8.37 8.21 0.811 8.82 9.37 0.69 9.67 9.81 0.881 8.44 8.05 0.668 5.74 5.36 0.528
Squared remmitances 147.41 161.62 0.717 165.98 169.89 0.886 127.19 119.79 0.741
Municipality ruled by PAN only 0.35 0.31 0.618 0.26 0.24 0.393 0.21 0.25 0.596 0.27 0.25 0.733 0.2 0.2 0.945 0.34 0.3 0.506
Municipality ruled by PRI only 0.4 0.47 0.449 0.49 0.48 0.908 0.54 0.49 0.511 0.5 0.49 0.922 0.51 0.48 0.642 0.45 0.5 0.443
Total homicide rate 2004 6.25 5.81 0.746 20.27 18.15 0.637 11.6 11.53 0.98 10.32 9.11 0.339 6.76 6.04 0.548
Homicide rate*decentralized 2005 1.64 1.2 0.382 11.63 10.57 0.787 6.49 5.33 0.494 4.31 3.95 0.731
Homicide rate1991 13.49 13.19 0.925
Homicide rate1993 12.05 12.32 0.919
Homicide rate1995 16.11 15.55 0.873
Homicide rate1996 13.17 12.79 0.892
Homicide rate1999 8.53 8.02 0.803
Homicide rate2000 7.69 7.68 0.996
Homicide rate2001 7.25 6.98 0.871
Homicide rate2003 8.68 7.91 0.659
Squared Homicide rate 2004 1080.31 952.75 0.712 523.82 569.1 0.893 242.09 203.66 0.519
By pacific coast 0.02 0.03 0.818 0.09 0.07 0.6
Distance north border 495.42 488.3 0.903
Minimum distance to any border 
(north, south, pacific coast) 0 0 0.829
Panel A: Cartels without drug 
related homicides                
Panel B: Drug related homicides
All that experienced at least one- 10th Decile 3rd Tertile 2nd Tertile 1st Tertile
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Table A.8  
Descriptive statistics of industries across matched areas that fall in the region of common support  
 
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
workers 192.7 159.1 277.0 168.5 -0.067 170.3 175.5 245.5 219.5 -0.055 126.1 180.5 210.8 105.5 -0.292*
(335.4) (240.3) (412.0) (206.0) (0.079) (299.5) (364.6) (374.3) (312.7) (0.041) (264.7) (603.6) (403.7) (98.68) (0.176)
owners 40.67 34.40 75.67 55.63 0.013 36.97 37.11 72.58 77.28 0.035 34.66 31.76 90.80 51.42 -0.140***
(111.8) (26.28) (151.0) (47.92) (0.026) (94.92) (51.31) (171.8) (109.8) (0.028) (121.1) (47.63) (301.6) (38.00) (0.053)
remuneration 41.17 54.16 54.73 52.25 -0.133** 39.34 43.81 51.77 49.25 -0.132** 30.80 35.75 41.56 27.90 -0.228*
(42.69) (54.44) (53.20) (56.34) (0.061) (40.95) (47.81) (50.49) (41.53) (0.053) (40.50) (48.36) (49.67) (24.32) (0.120)
investment 12762.1 48466.1 29093.6 11687.5 -1.315 11429.6 16711.1 22942.9 17204.8 -0.276 7175.5 -150.8 14256.7 288.3 -0.147
(56831.2) (238357.6) (101736.4) (43226.0) (0.930) (53259.0) (85402.8) (90816.5) (89736.1) (0.231) (42574.4) (6789.1) (67496.9) (723.5) (0.123)
workers 194.7 270.9 322.2 368.5 0.062 187.2 198.9 307.5 341.8 0.184*** 148.7 195.6 273.4 327.2 0.216
(157.4) (163.6) (180.1) (209.7) (0.104) (157.5) (159.0) (177.0) (193.6) (0.058) (141.7) (191.2) (159.4) (270.0) (0.135)
owners 140.5 178.0 237.8 248.7 0.047 133.6 146.7 226.9 254.4 0.149*** 111.2 137.9 215.6 233.1 0.099
(108.7) (100.7) (123.7) (130.4) (0.082) (108.8) (113.5) (124.2) (137.2) (0.050) (103.8) (126.4) (126.2) (160.8) (0.093)
remuneration 33.03 38.15 37.44 40.05 0.243** 32.75 32.54 36.40 36.93 0.058 28.54 33.27 32.22 34.50 0.011
(23.67) (12.70) (14.45) (12.54) (0.120) (24.77) (22.13) (15.28) (13.19) (0.069) (26.95) (25.83) (18.27) (20.81) (0.123)
investment 4784.9 6298.5 4118.1 6729.5 0.185 4439.0 4480.1 3952.7 5293.8 0.173** 2519.7 1603.9 2680.7 745.2 -0.101
(9114.1) (8250.9) (7578.7) (12480.2) (0.211) (8218.2) (8501.8) (7560.0) (9913.9) (0.086) (6189.7) (4100.7) (6019.1) (3451.6) (0.066)
workers 26.42 40.31 37.34 49.66 0.148 24.73 26.82 34.83 44.68 0.276*** 16.98 15.79 26.08 26.50 0.146
(31.94) (48.46) (33.78) (43.60) (0.212) (30.46) (38.63) (33.79) (51.96) (0.082) (26.47) (28.15) (30.57) (46.74) (0.136)
owners 5.554 7.555 11.54 13.51 0.213* 5.200 5.978 10.77 12.20 0.092 3.979 5.273 9.367 10.00 0.032
(6.092) (6.709) (8.151) (9.229) (0.118) (5.863) (6.751) (7.999) (9.121) (0.059) (5.468) (9.292) (8.783) (13.04) (0.193)
remuneration 46.86 63.93 56.75 69.32 -0.069 46.02 50.50 54.66 57.74 -0.066 33.79 32.21 42.95 33.16 -0.082
(44.75) (44.54) (39.17) (37.44) (0.179) (45.17) (51.98) (39.82) (39.33) (0.085) (42.45) (43.71) (40.81) (41.56) (0.097)
investment 2716.4 2102.6 1110.7 2492.2 0.345** 2716.5 2580.0 1361.7 5356.3 0.644*** 1141.0 461.6 743.7 346.8 0.061
(7038.2) (4099.8) (3038.9) (5493.7) (0.175) (7070.4) (13394.5) (3440.6) (26275.8) (0.221) (4055.1) (1741.1) (2490.9) (937.5) (0.066)
workers 6.077 6.808 7.827 9.161 0.116 5.656 4.495 7.369 8.355 0.198 5.847 6.204 6.044 6.298 0.119
(14.03) (8.270) (8.737) (12.08) (0.190) (13.96) (6.875) (8.978) (8.715) (0.132) (19.07) (14.68) (11.21) (10.28) (0.242)
owners 3.250 3.894 5.361 5.818 0.034 3.072 3.204 4.996 5.696 0.062 2.730 4.542 4.170 4.061 -0.068
(7.407) (4.238) (6.142) (5.296) (0.060) (8.237) (5.154) (6.195) (5.896) (0.040) (12.65) (10.91) (7.574) (5.772) (0.132)
remuneration 16.00 23.23 19.63 18.75 -0.244 15.75 15.70 18.93 18.23 -0.122 12.20 11.01 13.28 8.351 -0.262
(21.84) (31.82) (30.23) (19.44) (0.338) (21.59) (19.76) (30.33) (20.50) (0.161) (22.74) (24.20) (28.33) (14.57) (0.251)
investment 145.3 580.4 226.1 120.6 -0.435 137.8 135.6 209.2 157.2 -0.039 53.95 159.7 135.1 11.12 -0.170
(631.4) (2254.9) (1663.8) (418.8) (0.299) (578.4) (759.6) (1499.1) (959.3) (0.111) (441.8) (610.3) (1416.9) (68.64) (0.111)
778.0 1122.1 1199.7 1859.9 0.114 725.2 702.8 1115.4 1089.8 0.141 594.4 1010.0 1002.0 1344.5 -0.198*
(919.4) (1345.8) (1399.9) (3881.8) (0.261) (858.0) (818.0) (1338.5) (1508.7) (0.161) (907.3) (950.9) (1407.1) (1231.9) (0.119)
637 40 874 404 602 48
Panel A: Cartels without drug related homicides At least one drug-related homicides 10th Decile
ATT           
(no 
controls)
ATT           
(no 
controls)
ATT           
(no 
controls)
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Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) estimated with kernel matching and no controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A.8 (continuation) 
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
workers 175.9 188.4 253.0 244.9 -0.021 186.6 139.9 265.3 195.4 -0.051 261.8 258.7 352.2 329.9 -0.049
(315.2) (332.7) (392.2) (307.1) (0.051) (320.9) (219.8) (396.8) (250.3) (0.047) (400.7) (475.9) (498.2) (569.7) (0.093)
owners 36.38 43.60 72.47 98.21 0.117* 36.54 38.34 66.98 75.51 0.035 34.35 33.32 58.45 65.46 0.035
(91.79) (55.43) (157.8) (156.1) (0.062) (84.44) (62.87) (111.5) (96.64) (0.034) (34.83) (28.61) (50.62) (48.91) (0.023)
remuneration 38.97 38.98 51.43 44.29 -0.130** 40.63 44.33 53.55 50.50 -0.160*** 48.94 60.14 63.22 70.71 -0.091
(41.63) (33.32) (50.14) (29.89) (0.057) (41.11) (52.30) (51.82) (48.74) (0.062) (41.44) (57.37) (52.28) (50.28) (0.112)
investment 11586.5 7303.7 25471.6 9213.8 -0.296 12123.2 15571.3 28148.1 4555.9 -0.689* 20003.5 110834.3 52784.9 74038.5 -1.775
(52409.7) (45095.1) (96891.3) (52876.4) (0.250) (53076.0) (69461.0) (99219.2) (48413.7) (0.353) (63142.3) (636675.5) (136668.5) (202633.3) (1.390)
workers 187.3 207.2 307.4 347.1 0.211** 188.0 198.9 305.1 341.8 0.155* 226.2 220.0 341.8 370.1 0.199**
(161.4) (154.9) (179.2) (188.7) (0.085) (154.6) (162.2) (173.6) (189.4) (0.084) (164.2) (159.9) (177.0) (165.7) (0.081)
owners 134.7 154.6 229.0 267.6 0.226*** 134.2 150.5 223.6 258.6 0.133* 154.7 150.6 237.0 253.3 0.134*
(111.6) (110.0) (126.6) (142.4) (0.078) (107.0) (119.5) (121.1) (139.5) (0.076) (109.5) (106.7) (116.2) (111.2) (0.070)
remuneration 31.15 30.29 36.14 35.56 0.069 33.50 33.89 37.06 36.90 -0.032 38.59 36.39 40.57 41.75 0.134
(23.77) (19.12) (15.76) (13.21) (0.071) (24.75) (25.07) (14.51) (11.93) (0.101) (23.63) (20.16) (13.62) (9.328) (0.108)
investment 4548.7 3207.5 3849.0 3878.5 0.190** 4862.8 4799.0 4267.1 5784.9 0.201 8080.8 14886.6 6555.3 17426.7 0.517*
(8772.8) (5745.7) (7618.0) (8933.9) (0.095) (9001.3) (9053.2) (7924.3) (10964.7) (0.140) (11948.3) (27554.4) (9614.3) (28537.2) (0.299)
workers 24.67 24.01 34.75 37.63 0.165 25.95 30.89 35.66 52.36 0.373** 35.08 39.95 44.17 61.39 0.402***
(31.52) (32.13) (35.02) (36.67) (0.102) (31.42) (48.65) (33.64) (68.22) (0.170) (35.50) (41.41) (34.86) (47.20) (0.145)
owners 5.138 6.323 10.94 13.04 0.149* 5.284 6.384 10.79 12.90 0.094 5.931 5.721 11.38 11.99 0.083
(5.972) (6.844) (8.371) (10.15) (0.083) (5.767) (6.861) (7.413) (8.240) (0.089) (5.438) (4.742) (6.900) (5.389) (0.067)
remuneration 44.03 48.17 52.84 53.59 -0.085 47.86 53.40 57.37 61.07 -0.124 57.30 62.36 63.89 76.92 0.169
(45.00) (58.62) (40.38) (37.60) (0.135) (44.43) (46.67) (39.84) (32.67) (0.116) (44.86) (46.29) (34.66) (40.05) (0.125)
investment 2702.6 1935.6 1176.8 4436.0 0.633* 2910.3 2448.2 1334.6 2556.2 0.259 5164.9 8605.7 1704.6 12836.4 1.192*
(7062.6) (9308.7) (3314.4) (30791.3) (0.329) (7197.7) (7776.2) (3496.6) (6349.1) (0.175) (9476.9) (27617.9) (3903.8) (35071.3) (0.667)
workers 4.260 4.264 7.422 9.667 0.220*** 5.968 3.948 7.392 7.947 0.208 8.257 6.262 8.845 10.90 0.323
(8.873) (5.600) (8.668) (10.68) (0.080) (13.41) (4.597) (8.334) (7.368) (0.168) (16.47) (5.850) (8.308) (9.947) (0.260)
owners 3.025 3.249 5.057 6.785 0.155*** 2.966 2.754 5.005 5.533 0.056 3.720 3.790 5.945 6.444 0.021
(8.199) (4.419) (6.085) (7.340) (0.059) (4.564) (3.399) (5.658) (5.165) (0.048) (5.345) (3.500) (5.793) (4.575) (0.050)
remuneration 13.74 13.60 18.58 16.12 -0.106 16.63 15.45 19.85 18.90 -0.112 22.21 24.54 24.42 28.63 -0.079
(17.74) (18.79) (30.04) (23.72) (0.166) (22.36) (18.52) (32.07) (16.99) (0.200) (24.78) (21.60) (30.21) (21.10) (0.258)
investment 140.7 27.49 204.6 71.08 -0.012 130.3 223.8 177.0 322.6 0.041 179.6 427.2 311.7 299.2 -0.217
(573.3) (77.23) (1448.8) (310.1) (0.098) (553.6) (1080.0) (1358.4) (1697.6) (0.178) (650.9) (1111.5) (1791.6) (2119.1) (0.225)
730.5 788.3 1026.3 1024.0 -0.079 665.3 607.6 1097.9 983.7 -0.100 831.9 757.9 1427.1 1514.3 1.419*
(900.0) (792.4) (1211.6) (1091.6) (0.143) (716.9) (871.1) (1324.7) (1366.0) (0.188) (768.0) (1303.0) (1416.7) (3199.1) (0.733)
767 141   513 122 840 135
Panel B: Drug related homicides
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Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) estimated with kernel matching and no controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A.9 
Impact of drug cartels and drug-related homicides on welfare statistics excluding buffer areas within 20km 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Food 
poverty
 
Capability 
poverty
Patrimon
y poverty Gini
Lived in 
another 
state 5 
years ago
Lived in 
U.S. 5 
years ago
Total 
population
Aged 6-
14 out of 
school
Aged 15+ 
without 
primary
Population 
aged 6-14
Population 
aged 15-17
Schools 
(primary to 
highschool) 
per pupil
Teachers 
(primary to 
highschool) 
per pupil
Total energy 
consumption
Energy 
consumption 
per capita
Unemployment 
rate 2000-2010
Number 
unemployed 
2000 vs 
2010
ATT: time*treated -0.315 -0.289 -0.229 -0.558** 0.418 -0.644 -0.149*** 0.059 0.028 0.035* 0.021 -0.043 -0.090 0.057 0.100 -0.438 -1.427
(0.223) (0.222) (0.220) (0.249) (0.326) (0.661) (0.053) (0.116) (0.035) (0.019) (0.034) (0.065) (0.114) (0.189) (0.090) (0.879) (1.881)
Observations 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 390 362 250 250 396 396
R-squared 0.140 0.126 0.104 0.159 0.353 0.377 0.212 0.298 0.879 0.142 0.236 0.145 0.209 0.052 0.043 0.513 0.367
(18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (3) (4)
Panel B: Drug related homicides
Areas with at least one drug related homicide 
ATT: time*treated 0.075 0.084 0.107 0.040 0.395* 0.594 0.082 0.070 0.030* 0.100*** 0.079** -0.033 0.009 -0.255 0.029 -0.023 28.969
(0.076) (0.081) (0.095) (0.125) (0.226) (0.857) (0.057) (0.058) (0.018) (0.021) (0.032) (0.029) (0.045) (0.342) (0.054) (0.334) (53.418)
Observations 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,588 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,508 1,350 1,004 1,004 1,583 1,583
R-squared 0.075 0.051 0.034 0.173 0.255 0.464 0.133 0.341 0.904 0.029 0.190 0.142 0.224 0.008 0.010 0.610 0.408
(35) (36) (37) 0.174 (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (5) (6)
0.175
ATT: time*treated 0.217* 0.216 0.200 0.176 0.024 -0.026 -0.008 -0.153 0.033 -0.023 -0.016 0.111 0.204 0.954 1.919 0.420 0.969
(0.129) (0.141) (0.168) 0.177 (0.179) (0.520) (0.033) (0.271) (0.036) (0.016) (0.015) (0.083) (0.172) (0.654) (1.199) (1.047) (1.457)
Observations 230 230 230 0.178 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 222 188 124 124 230 230
R-squared 0.166 0.156 0.129 0.179 0.264 0.447 0.096 0.171 0.867 0.211 0.058 0.035 0.148 0.073 0.230 0.674 0.389
Third tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.008 0.021 0.057 0.019 0.066 0.927 0.032 0.068 0.018 0.044*** 0.046** -0.007 0.137** -0.683 0.075 0.101 1.502
(0.074) -0.078 (0.091) (0.159) (0.195) (0.927) (0.050) (0.076) (0.023) (0.013) (0.023) (0.036) (0.054) (0.745) (0.177) (0.597) (2.200)
Observations 792 792 792 792 792 792 792 792 792 792 792 752 650 444 444 790 790
R-squared 0.132 0.105 0.070 0.170 0.305 0.405 0.103 0.301 0.863 0.143 0.191 0.226 0.339 0.014 0.067 0.598 0.350
Second tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated
-0.145 -0.138 -0.106 -0.219 0.943 0.351 0.243** 0.105 0.074*** 0.166*** 0.126** -0.065** 0.047 1.887 0.282 0.240 9.166*
Observations (0.125) (0.129) (0.133) (0.226) (0.848) (1.873) (0.108) (0.094) (0.024) (0.039) (0.056) (0.029) (0.059) (1.326) (0.177) (0.515) (4.930)
R-squared 714 714 714 712 714 714 714 714 714 714 714 678 622 474 474 712 712
0.160 0.123 0.062 0.112 0.092 0.364 0.099 0.380 0.913 0.054 0.144 0.267 0.308 0.036 0.044 0.681 0.198
First tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.183 0.213 0.269** -0.057 0.878* 0.630 0.280* 0.088 0.070*** 0.153*** 0.163** -0.053 -0.074 -0.606 -0.014 -0.460 9.389*
(0.126) (0.130) (0.129) (0.290) (0.454) (1.225) (0.143) (0.098) (0.025) (0.042) (0.074) (0.042) (0.075) (0.701) (0.312) (0.928) (4.813)
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 442 436 372 372 458 458
R-squared 0.073 0.051 0.036 0.137 0.227 0.546 0.111 0.520 0.941 0.058 0.252 0.393 0.367 0.037 0.060 0.744 0.252
Panel A: Cartels without drug related homicides
Top 10 decile of drug related homicides 
 
Controls used in specifications (1) to (15): poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two 
years. Controls used in specifications (16) and (17): poor-relief subsidies per capita and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A.10  
Placebo impact on welfare statistics, splitting control group into control and placebo treatment (2000-2005 vs. 2006-2010) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Food 
poverty
 Capability 
poverty
Patrimony 
poverty Gini
Lived in 
another 
state 5 
years ago
Lived in 
U.S. 5 
years ago
Total 
population
Aged 6-14 
out of 
school
Aged 15+ 
without 
primary
Population 
aged 6-14
Population 
aged 15-17
Schools 
(primary to 
highschool
) per pupil
Teachers 
(primary to 
highschool
) per pupil
Total energy 
consumption
Energy 
consumption 
per capita
Unemployment 
rate 2000-2010
Number 
unemployed 
2000 vs 
2010
Panel A: Cartels without drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.134* -0.127 -0.111 -0.047 -0.135** 0.188 -0.028 -0.020 -0.039 -0.008 -0.005 0.089 0.046 0.056 0.130** 1.017 -0.454
(0.081) (0.082) (0.086) (0.105) (0.064) (0.462) (0.026) (0.103) (0.029) (0.012) (0.015) (0.079) (0.057) (0.100) (0.058) (0.830) (0.784)
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,084 892 524 524 1,091 1,091
R-squared 0.040 0.058 0.132 0.059 0.263 0.195 0.090 0.163 0.827 0.052 0.224 0.145 0.121 0.029 0.024 0.391 0.199
Panel B: Drug related homicides
Areas with at least one drug related homicide -0.078 -0.066 -0.048 -0.077 0.077 -0.095 -0.012 0.085 -0.021 -0.010 -0.008 -0.072 0.026 -0.287* -1.028** 0.063 -0.100
ATT: time*treated (0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.084) (0.068) (0.301) (0.019) (0.059) (0.021) (0.008) (0.012) (0.052) (0.050) (0.158) (0.512) (0.523) (0.587)
1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,132 932 552 552 1,141 1,141
Observations 0.025 0.043 0.114 0.058 0.265 0.217 0.066 0.210 0.829 0.075 0.193 0.151 0.133 0.035 0.033 0.391 0.175
R-squared
Top 10 decile of drug related homicides 
ATT: time*treated -0.058 -0.044 -0.024 -0.083 0.174 -0.026 0.003 0.046 -0.009 0.002 0.039 -0.037 -0.080 -0.754 -0.728 1.579 0.339
(0.106) (0.105) (0.102) (0.141) (0.119) (0.457) (0.050) (0.115) (0.062) (0.014) (0.031) (0.083) (0.080) (0.549) (0.621) (1.622) (1.057)
Observations 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 370 210 210 456 456
R-squared 0.026 0.058 0.189 0.180 0.294 0.227 0.050 0.263 0.737 0.068 0.191 0.190 0.167 0.054 0.053 0.355 0.233
Third tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.141** -0.127* -0.090 -0.146 0.164 0.057 -0.025 0.120 0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.095 -0.015 -0.260 -0.688 -0.341 -0.200
(0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.121) (0.112) (0.415) (0.026) (0.074) (0.027) (0.010) (0.018) (0.059) (0.060) (0.161) (0.431) (0.664) (0.833)
Observations 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 638 528 306 306 637 637
R-squared 0.042 0.064 0.152 0.054 0.256 0.223 0.057 0.227 0.834 0.047 0.241 0.143 0.116 0.045 0.047 0.435 0.188
Second tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.106 -0.092 -0.092 0.015 0.084 -0.327 -0.015 0.033 -0.010 -0.025* -0.019 -0.039 0.044 -0.630 -2.110 -0.335 -0.482
(0.086) (0.087) (0.093) (0.129) (0.117) (0.291) (0.023) (0.089) (0.027) (0.015) (0.016) (0.063) (0.086) (0.438) (1.747) (0.733) (0.628)
Observations 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 562 440 248 248 566 566
R-squared 0.057 0.079 0.141 0.054 0.212 0.248 0.102 0.214 0.862 0.074 0.168 0.136 0.096 0.056 0.032 0.376 0.180
First tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.010 0.012 0.027 -0.009 0.039 -0.085 -0.001 0.084 -0.058** -0.018** -0.020 -0.053 0.031 -0.139 -0.854 -0.028 0.196
(0.086) (0.090) (0.103) (0.104) (0.092) (0.451) (0.026) (0.073) (0.028) (0.009) (0.016) (0.059) (0.059) (0.150) (0.705) (0.612) (0.882)
Observations 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 622 522 316 316 626 626
R-squared 0.025 0.038 0.099 0.086 0.341 0.210 0.096 0.230 0.847 0.166 0.197 0.146 0.214 0.032 0.087 0.452 0.197
 
Controls used in specifications (1) to (15): Poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two 
years.  Controls used for specifications (16) and (17): Poor-relief subsidies per capita and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table A.11  
Placebo impact on industries, splitting control group into control and placebo treatment (2000-2005 vs. 2006-2008) 
 
Tax revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment workers owners remuneration investment 
Panel A: Cartels without drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.041 0.005 0.048 0.231 -0.059 -0.090 0.258** 0.266 0.138 -0.032 -0.168 -0.129 0.198* 0.129 0.291 0.337 0.379
(0.101) (0.052) (0.100) (0.206) (0.090) (0.095) (0.107) (0.335) (0.098) (0.136) (0.125) (0.180) (0.116) (0.104) (0.377) (0.445) (0.283)
Observations 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158
R-squared 0.040 0.047 0.039 0.056 0.330 0.349 0.047 0.016 0.063 0.296 0.043 0.025 0.014 0.023 0.028 0.014 0.133
Panel B: Drug related homicides
Areas with at least one drug related homicide 0.079 0.059 -0.001 -0.055 0.003 0.008 -0.021 0.031 0.037 -0.025 0.037 -0.006 0.086* 0.068* 0.021 -0.100 -0.089*
ATT: time*treated (0.106) (0.121) (0.043) (0.088) (0.076) (0.088) (0.068) (0.049) (0.064) (0.080) (0.059) (0.071) (0.047) (0.036) (0.048) (0.104) (0.048)
1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826
Observations 0.030 0.041 0.015 0.009 0.230 0.268 0.023 0.074 0.008 0.129 0.015 0.020 0.030 0.023 0.003 0.004 0.047
R-squared
Top 10 decile of drug related homicides 
ATT: time*treated -0.019 -0.028 -0.012 0.124 -0.072 -0.059 0.008 -0.098 0.064 0.228 0.108 -0.506 0.070 0.070 -0.013 -0.448 -0.066
(0.223) (0.230) (0.087) (0.274) (0.175) (0.190) (0.126) (0.124) (0.115) (0.225) (0.187) (0.484) (0.072) (0.061) (0.143) (0.787) (0.175)
Observations 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834
R-squared 0.034 0.044 0.065 0.063 0.235 0.259 0.084 0.160 0.024 0.143 0.019 0.100 0.020 0.038 0.009 0.070 0.102
Third tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.128 -0.175 -0.096 0.072 0.018 0.043 -0.042 0.064 0.132 -0.118 0.271** 0.067 0.101 0.052 0.080 -0.023 -0.151**
(0.113) (0.114) (0.096) (0.116) (0.115) (0.137) (0.079) (0.069) (0.155) (0.124) (0.128) (0.059) (0.084) (0.034) (0.075) (0.041) (0.064)
Observations 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346
R-squared 0.025 0.036 0.031 0.009 0.231 0.272 0.043 0.052 0.011 0.116 0.021 0.013 0.033 0.025 0.011 0.010 0.044
Second tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.298 0.284 0.017 -0.014 0.099 0.116 -0.056 -0.028 -0.045 -0.070 -0.003 -0.033 0.084 0.038 -0.011 -0.059 -0.001
(0.238) (0.277) (0.041) (0.129) (0.130) (0.151) (0.152) (0.064) (0.056) (0.103) (0.050) (0.060) (0.069) (0.050) (0.046) (0.055) (0.090)
Observations 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366
R-squared 0.051 0.057 0.045 0.005 0.254 0.291 0.025 0.142 0.019 0.115 0.048 0.016 0.041 0.021 0.008 0.007 0.051
First tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.071 0.052 0.091 -0.457 -0.075 -0.106 0.049 0.103* 0.007 -0.023 -0.197** 0.051 0.061 0.104 0.003 -0.063 -0.103*
(0.149) (0.171) (0.080) (0.316) (0.116) (0.126) (0.070) (0.061) (0.089) (0.108) (0.086) (0.074) (0.071) (0.071) (0.084) (0.103) (0.062)
Observations 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328
R-squared 0.028 0.041 0.036 0.044 0.213 0.254 0.024 0.056 0.028 0.204 0.077 0.079 0.026 0.027 0.006 0.001 0.068
Wholesale business Real EstateManufactures Retail trade
 
Controls used in all specifications: Poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A.12  
Placebo test using 1990-2000 as pre-treatment and 2001-2005 as post-treatment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Food 
poverty
 
Capability 
poverty
Patrimony 
poverty Gini
Total 
population
Aged 6-14 
out of 
school
Aged 15+ 
without 
primary
Panel A: Cartels without drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.209 0.214 0.223 0.005 0.006 -0.044 -0.032
(0.134) (0.137) (0.147) (0.109) (0.022) (0.081) (0.029)
Observations 881 881 881 881 881 881 879
R-squared 0.164 0.134 0.071 0.389 0.048 0.636 0.896
Panel B: Drug related homicides
Areas with at least one drug related homicide 0.069 0.060 0.020 0.012 0.043 0.022 -0.009
ATT: time*treated (0.063) (0.067) (0.083) (0.086) (0.039) (0.047) (0.017)
2,301 2,301 2,301 2,301 2,301 2,301 2,301
Observations 0.284 0.229 0.069 0.411 0.038 0.718 0.902
R-squared
Top 10 decile of drug related homicides 
ATT: time*treated -0.029 -0.035 -0.023 0.211 -0.025* -0.077 -0.075*
(0.153) (0.152) (0.144) (0.204) (0.014) (0.135) (0.042)
Observations 698 698 698 698 698 698 698
R-squared 0.208 0.155 0.030 0.659 0.105 0.436 0.836
Third tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.038 -0.048 -0.073 -0.083 0.010 -0.005 0.022
(0.066) (0.072) (0.090) (0.090) (0.038) (0.056) (0.022)
Observations 1,354 1,354 1,354 1,354 1,354 1,354 1,352
R-squared 0.256 0.197 0.044 0.433 0.010 0.680 0.863
Second tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated -0.003 -0.013 -0.055 -0.038 0.039 -0.007 -0.005
(0.072) (0.076) (0.091) (0.095) (0.030) (0.046) (0.019)
Observations 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,088
R-squared 0.237 0.191 0.058 0.318 0.021 0.776 0.925
First tertile of drug related homicides
ATT: time*treated 0.153 0.148 0.117 -0.142 0.034 0.095 0.019
(0.127) (0.135) (0.149) (0.114) (0.039) (0.072) (0.023)
Observations 705 705 705 705 705 705 705
R-squared 0.349 0.303 0.159 0.357 0.112 0.795 0.941
Treated vs. controls
 
Controls used in all specifications: Poor-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years.   
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